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Abstract
This thesis examines some features of the labour market, and their macroe-
conomic consequences.
The first paper relates the observed flatter Phillips Curve to the rise in
labour turnover and temporary employment. In a New Keynesian model
of sticky wages, workers or unions discount future wage income with a low
discount factor if there is a strong flow of job turnover. In the New Keynesian
wage Phillips Curve, this implies that future inflation is discounted more
heavily than without job turnover. In the long run, the Phillips Curve is
much flatter, and is no longer vertical or near-vertical; in the middle and
long run, the curve appears flatter as turnover creates a bias if it is not
accounted for.
The second paper studies the impact of a rise in monopsony in the labour
market: wages are set by employers instead of workers/unions. If rigid wages
are set by monopsonistic employers and there is inflation, the fall in the real
wage lowers the labour supply. In such a world, inflation is contractionary:
the Phillips curve is inverted. The paper then examines a model where
employers and employees both have market power, and use it to bargain
over wages. The slope of the bargained Phillips Curve depends on each
side’s relative power. An increase in employers’ power flattens the Phillips
Curve.
The last paper accounts for the possibility of featherbedding (or overman-
ning) in the labour market. In such a case, unions are able to impose a level
of employment above the firm’s optimum. In other words, the wage is above
the worker’s marginal rate of substitution, and above the firm’s marginal
product of labour. In this case labour market rigidities act as a distortionary
tax on profits rather than employment; this generates a different source of
inefficiency. While these distortions are very costly in the long run, removing
them can be detrimental to employment in the short run.
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Chapter 1
Job Turnover and the slope
of the Phillips Curve
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1.1 Introduction
The Phillips Curve is central to macroeconomics but its shape has been
questioned recently. The strong short run relationship between inflation and
output (or unemployment) seems to have vanished in the aftermath of the
2008 financial crisis: unemployment increased and then fell sharply, while
inflation remained low and positive. The relationship seems to have broken
down. This would suggest that the short-run Phillips curve has become
flatter, as evidenced by Blanchard et al. (2015) or Ball and Mazumder (2014).
The idea of a vertical, or near-vertical long-run Phillips Curve, has also
been questioned. In a recent Peterson policy brief (2016), Blanchard argues
that the long run Phillips curve has become flatter, largely due to inflation
expectations anchoring at zero or low levels. As such, there would be a real
trade-off between output and inflation in the long run. Some explanations
such as menu costs and anchored expectations have been put forward, but
they either lack microfoundations or tractability, which would be useful for
welfare analysis. Others relate it to globalisation (see Carney, 2017).
This paper, instead, relates these evolutions to job turnover. The advan-
tage of this microfoundation is that it is more observable and more tractable.
As we shall see in the next subsection, there has been a secular trend in job
turnover and other features of the labour market over the past decades (see
Haldane, 2016). This paper shows how it can explain the evolution of the
Phillips curve: a flatter long run curve which is no longer vertical or near
vertical. And in the short run, the curve will look flatter than if turnover is
properly accounted for. The optimal monetary policy, in terms of inflation
target and stabilisation, are then derived.
Job turnover
In the New Keynesian wage Phillips curve models, such as the one pioneered
by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), workers (or unions) set staggered
wages optimally. Current (wage) inflation depends on future (wage) inflation
expectations as well as the output gap. In the log linear approximation, the
coefficient of future inflation is β, the riskless discount factor.
However, when there is a significant probability that a worker quits, or
that he will be fired and replaced by someone else, the net present value
of his job will be discounted with a lower factor than the risk-less discount
factor. It is important to distinguish layoffs and (personal) dismissals because
persons who quit or are dismissed are replaced and hence count as turnover,
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while layoffs diminish employment and are not replaced by new hires. 1 This
probability of turnover makes the wage setting decision, and hence the wage
Phillips curve, less forward looking.
Figure 1.1 comes from the job tenure survey from the OECD, for people
aged 25 − 54. The proportion of people less than a year into their job is a
good indicator of yearly job turnover, though temporary contracts probably
overstate the figure. In most countries, there has been an increase in the less
than one year proportion of workers, which indicates a rising turnover. This
can also be seen with the increase of the less than three years proportion,
which is less sensible to temporary employment. Last, the proportion of
people more than ten years into thir job has fallen accross most countries.
This is highly suggestive of an increased turnover.
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Figure 1.1: Turnover (OECD job tenure survey)
The increasing share of temporary contracts, and the recent rise in the
1The probability of being laid off should not matter for the worker, if the union acts as
an insurance mechanism. Because the union is assumed to split the wage income between
employed and unemployed members, the employee does not lose his income when he is
laid off. But turnover relates to quits and personal dismissals, not layoffs. And it is not
the purpose of the union to insure against these, so the turnover probability is a relevant
discount factor.
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“gig economy”(part time contracts, self-employed contractors, zero-hours in
Britain) are also likely to weaken collective bargaining in favour of more
individual bargaining, as suggested by Haldane (2017). This would suggest
lower wages, but also less forward looking decisions, which is the point of this
paper. Table 1.2 shows how the share of temporary contracts has evolved
over time (again using OECD data). While the upward trend is not always
monotonic and varies in magnitude accross countries, it is relatively strong,
especially in countries like France, Italy or the Netherlands).
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Figure 1.2: Share of temporary employment (OECD)
Calvo meets perpetual youth
A crucial assumption is that when a worker quits (or is dismissed) and is
replaced by an entrant worker, the wage stickiness will be (at least partially)
transmitted to the entrant. The entrant does not renegotiate its wage im-
mediately, and has to abide by the wage of the previous incumbent it has
replaced. Or equivalently, there is no difference between incumbents and en-
trants in their distribution of wages. Assuming wage rigidity for new hires is
crucial in models such as Hall (2005) or Gertler and Trigari (2009), who com-
bine wage and labour search frictions. Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016)
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find no evidence that the wage of new hires is more cyclical than for existing
workers. Galuscak et al. (2012) find similar results for 15 EU countries.
This model of entry has some perpetual youth flavour as in Blanchard
(1985). As hinted by Weil (1989), the crucial feature in these models is as
much the probability of death of the agent, as the stream of newborns, who
don’t have a say over decisions made before their birth. 2 Here, when a new
worker starts a job, he is bound by the decisions of his predecessor. 3 The
externality between existing and new agents creates the extra discounting.
Related literature
Snower and Tesfaselassie (2017) derive a positive optimal long run inflation
target in the presence of job turnover, but they do not investigate the short
run properties much. Bilbiie, Ghironi and Melitz (2012; 2016) as well as
Bilbiie, Fujiwara and Ghironi (2014) look at the optimal long run monetary
policy in similar setup: sticky prices with firm entry and exit. In their
model, the exit probability affects the Phillips curve and the optimal long
run Ramsey policy. While these papers use a Rotemberg instead of a Calvo
framework, and inflation offsets different long run distortions, the intuition,
as well as the assumption that new workers cannot reset their wage, is largely
the same 4. But this paper shows how turnover leads to a flatter long run
Phillips curve, and a perceived flatter curve in the short run. It also explains
how the optimality of price targeting is broken, compared to the classical
result in Woodford (2003), Benigno and Woodford (2004), or Gali (2008).
Last, it shows how optimal short run policies are affected.
Different explanations have been put forward for the recently flatter
Phillips Curve. Ball and Mazumder (2011) suggest that with menu costs,
price changes will be less frequent when inflation is low, and the resulting
Phillips Curve will be flatter. Blanchard (2016) relies on anchored inflation
expectations. My approach has the advantage of tractability and observable
micro-foundations, which allow for a welfare analysis. While the labour mar-
ket has been highlighted as a possible driver of the flatter Phillips Curve (see
Haldane, 2017 or chapter 2 of the October 2017 World Economic Outlook),
no proper model has been suggested yet. The idea of a global Phillips Curve
– inflation reacting to global not domestic conditions – has also been floated
2In the positive sense, the death probability creates the lower discount factor, but in
the normative sense, the externality is caused by the stream of new workers.
3Or if wages are set by a union, it only cares about the welfare of its existing members.
4In my Calvo framework, workers adopt the wage distribution of existing workers. In
a Rotemberg setup, it is assumed that new workers (or firms) take the existing symmetric
wage (or price), and are not free to choose their starting wage (price) optimally
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(eg. Carney, 2017), but again without a proper underlying model.
This paper also belongs to the stream of literature that reassesses the
New Keynesian model in light of the Great Recession and the Zero Lower
Bound. While this paper introduces an extra discount factor in the Phillips
curve, other papers have introduced a discount factor in the Euler equation
instead, to explain the forward guidance puzzle. In McKay, Nakamura and
Steinsson (2016) this is due to incomplete financial markets, while in Del
Negro, Giannoni and Patterson (2013), it comes from a Blanchard-Yaari
model of perpetual youth for households which is similar to this paper (where
it applies to workers). The interaction between a discounted Phillips curve
and a discounted Euler equation has been partially studied by Gabaix (2016).
Last, this paper is related to the literature on the optimal level of infla-
tion, which does not solely rely on the Phillips curve. In their handbook
chapter (2011), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe document such other motives for
positive inflation. If the price stickiness exhibits a quality bias (Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2009), then a positive inflation will simply ensure that
the hedonic price level remains constant. If wages are more rigid downwards
than upwards, positive inflation will make relative wage adjustments easier
(Olivera, 1964; Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996; Kim and Ruge-Murcia,
2009). A positive amount of inflation might also be useful to increase the
nominal interest rate safely above zero, in case the zero lower bound needs
to be avoided (Adam and Billi, 2006; Reifschnieder and Williams, 2000).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 builds a New Keynesian
model with sticky wages, as well as job turnover. The non linear Phillips
curve is derived and linearly approximated. Section 3 investigates and esti-
mates the prediction of a flatter Phillips curve in the short, middle and long
run. Last, Section 4 solves the welfare maximization problem, both in the non
linear (steady state inflation) and quadratic setups (optimal stabilisation).
1.2 The model
1.2.1 A microfounded model
The model of wage rigidities closely follows Gali’s (2008) notations, with
monopolistic competition in the labour market. There is a continuum of
wage-setting worker types, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
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Households and firms
Let me first look at the household. A worker of type j maximizes a utility
E0
∑
t≥0
βtU(Ct(j), Nt(j)) (1.1)
The period utility function U is separable in consumption and labour. The
utility of consumption C, u(C), is a concave function with inverse elasticity
of intertemporal substitution σ, while the disutility of labour N , v(N) is
convex with an inverse Frisch elasticity φ. The utility from consumption and
disutility from labour are scaled by a parameter λ:
U(Ct(j), Nt(j)) = u(Ct)− v(Nt(j)) = C
1−σ
t
1− σ − λ
Nt(j)1+φ
1 + φ (1.2)
Perfect competition is assumed in the goods market. The production
function has diminishing returns to labour Nt, with a labour elasticity (1−α):
Yt = N1−αt
Labour is a CES aggregate of the labour of each type j, with a wage elasticity
of substitution :
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(j)1−1/dj
] 
−1
The aggregate wage index Wt is
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(j)1−dj
] 1
1−
The amount of labour of type j employed by firm i is
Nt(j) =
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−
Nt
Worker j maximizes the expected utility (1.1) subject to the budget con-
straint
PtCt(j) +QtBt(j) = Bt−1(j) + (1− τt)Wt(j)Nt(j) +Dt + Tt
where τt is a proportional labour tax (or subsidy) on his labour compensation
Wt(j)Nt(j), Dt is the dividend from owning a diversified portfolio of firms,
and Tt is a lump sum transfer (or tax) from the government. New bonds
Bt(j) can be bought or sold at price Qt, the stochastic discount factor of the
household. Balanced government budget in each period (Tt = τtWtNt), as
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well as zero net supply of bonds, ensures that consumption and output are
equal in each period:
PtCt = WtNt +Dt = PtYt
With perfect competition for goods, prices are equal to marginal costs, or
Pt = MCt = Wt
Nαt
1− α
Hence the real wage is linked to output as
Ωt = (1− α)Y −
α
1−α
t
With decreasing returns to scale, firms make a profit Dt = αPtYt.
As in Erceg et al. (2000) or Gali (2008), let us assume markets with
complete contingent claims for consumption but not leisure. This ensures
full consumption smoothing accross agents.
Lemma 1. With complete markets, there is full consumption smoothing:
∀(t, j), Ct(j) = Ct = Yt
The Euler equation of consumption pins down the riskless discount factor
Qt = Etβ
Pt
Pt+1
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
= β Pt
Pt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ
(1.3)
The labour supply decision for a worker j in problem (1.1) is equivalent to
maximizing the following quantity in each period
u′(Yt)
(1− τ)Wt(j)Nt(j)
Pt
− λNt(j)
1+φ
1 + φ (1.4)
Distortions and dispersions
Let us define the first-best and flexible outcomes. Using the utility and
production function, the first-best level of output is
Y¯ =
(1− α
λ
) 1
σ+φ+α1−α
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Lemma 2. In the flexible outcome, the real wage Ω = W
P
is a markup µ
above the marginal rate of substitution of the worker:
µ =
(

(− 1) (1− τ)
)
The flexible-wage output is
Y˜ =
(
1− α
λµ
) 1
σ+φ+α1−α = Y¯
(
1
µ
) 1
σ+φ+α1−α
The markups depend on the wage elasticity – with a high elasticity, the
markup is close to 1. But it also depends on the wage tax τ . A positive tax
creates an additional wedge, but a subsidy can offset the inefficiency caused
by the finite wage elasticity. Unless the subsidies fully offset the wedges
(µ = 1), the flexible output will be inefficiently low as Y˜ < Y¯ .
With staggered wages, the wage dispersion will be costly in terms of
welfare. When wages are heterogeneous, the aggregate number of hours
must increase to produce the same amount of goods.
Lemma 3. The aggregate utility function can be written
∫ 1
0
U(Ct, Nt(j))dj = Y˜ 1−σ

(
Yt
Y˜
)1−σ
1− σ −
1−α
1+φ∆t
(
Yt
Y˜
) 1+φ
1−α
µ
 (1.5)
with the wage dispersions
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Wt(j)
Wt
)−(1+φ)
dj ≥ 1 (1.6)
1.2.2 Sticky wages and the Phillips Curve
Worker discounting
A fraction θ of workers have sticky wages, and a fraction δ keeps their job
from one period to another; the two are independent. The discount factor
accounts for the price and the firms survival probabilities θ and δ. Instead
of maximizing the discounted sum of expression (1.4) with a discount factor
β, the applicable rate of time preference will be βθδ: the disutility of labour
– attached to a wage and a worker – is discounted by βθδ, while the labour
compensation is discounted by θδQt.
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It is assumed that when a worker is replaced, the new worker cannot
automatically renegotiate his wage. Instead, he faces the same probability of
sticky wages than existing workers. If they were completely free to choose new
wages, the effect would die out; but as long as the new wage partly takes into
account the wage of existing workers, the effect would be lessened but not die
out. This gives a discrepancy between the joint survival probability θδ of the
optimal wage setting decision, and the true wage stickiness θ that is featured
in the dynamics of the aggregate wage and dispersion. This is the cause of
the flatter wage Phillips curve5. As mentioned before, evidence in Gertler et
al. (2016) or Galuscak et al (2012) tends to support this assumption.
It is also possible to think about the case where it is the union which
sets the wage of workers of type j, and the union insures workers against
layoffs but not quits or dismissals. When a worker quits, or is dismissed, we
can assume that he leaves his labour type and finds a different occupation,
where wages are set by a different union. As such, if the union maximizes
the utility of its existing members, employed or not, it will have a short
discounting horizon. And it will not take into account the utility of future
members, because they do not belong to this union yet.
The non linear Phillips curve
When a worker is free to set a wage wt(j), he seeks to maximize the discounted
sum of the wage compensation minus the disutility, defined in expression
(1.4).
Et
∑
(θβδ)T−t
[
u′(YT )
(1− τT )wt(j)NT (j)
PT
− λNT (j)
1+φ
1 + φ
]
Lemma 4. The re-optimizing price w∗t is :
(
w∗t
Wt
)1+φ
=
Et
∑(θβδ)T−tµt ( WtWT )−(1+φ) λN1+φT
Et
∑(θβδ)T−t ( Wt
WT
)1−
ΩTu′(YT )NT
=
(
Kt
Ft
)
(1.7)
with recursive terms Ft and Kt
Ft = (1− α)Y 1−σt + θβδEtFt+1Π−1t+1 (1.8)
Kt = µtλY
1+φ
1−α
t + θβδEtKt+1Πt+1(1+φ) (1.9)
5. In their Rotemberg setup, Snower and Tesfaselassie (2017) (or Bilbiie Ghironi and
Melitz, 2012;2016) assume that new workers (or firms) start with the symmetric wage
(price) of existing workers (firms). It is similar to here: entrants are bound by incumbents
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This is where the job survival probability, δ plays a role, compared to
the standard model. δ is an extra factor, appearing here in the worker’s
discounting, through the recursive Ft and Kt. In the recursive equation, Ft
depends on the expected future value EtFt+1, multiplied by the inflation and
a discount factor θβδ. The exact same phenomenon occurs for the recursive
term Kt. The δ makes these two terms less forward looking than in the
standard model, and it makes the wage Phillips curve flatter, as we will see
with the linear approximation.
In each period, only a fraction (1 − θ) of wages are re-optimized at the
value w∗t , while a fraction θ still follows the previous distribution of wages,
with an aggregate Wt−1.Using the definition of the aggregate wage, the wage
level Wt is a weighted aggregate of the previous wage level Wt−1 and the
current optimal wage w∗t : 6
W 1−t = θW 1−t−1 + (1− θ)(w∗t )1−
This provides the dynamics for the wage inflation and dispersion
1− θΠt−1
1− θ = w(Πt) =
(
w∗t
Wt
)1−
=
(
Ft
Kt
) −1
1+φ
(1.10)
∆t = θ∆t−1Πt(1+φ) + (1− θ)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1 (1.11)
Linear quadratic setup
Although we will look at the optimal steady state level of inflation that the
non linear model yields, it is useful to derive a linear quadratic approximation
around a zero inflation steady state. In the flexible price steady state, there
is no inflation (Π = 1), and no dispersion (∆ = 1). The steady state values
Y˜ , Ω¯, F¯ and K¯ are easy to pin down. Let us define the percentage deviation
of each variable: pit = log Πt, and dt = log ∆t. Similarly yt, ωt, ft and kt
denote log deviations of the capital-letter variables from the steady state.
Proposition 1. The linear wage Phillips curve is
pit = κyt + βδEt [pit+1] (1.12)
with κ =
(
φ+α
1−α + σ
)
(1−θ)(1−θβδ)
θ
1
1+φ
This linear wage Phillips curve is broadly similar with the standard wage
Phillips curve in a model of price and wage stickiness. Current wage inflation
6Importantly, the new hires follow existing wages, so that turnover δ doesn’t play a
role in this law of motion of the aggregate wage
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positively depends on the output gap and future expected wage inflation,
and negatively on the real wage. However, two differences stand out. The
coefficient κ is slightly different as it features the parameter δ. But most
importantly, future inflation is discounted by βδ instead of simply β. In terms
of intuition, this is because βδ is now the discount factor that is applicable
to the job tenure of the worker.
1.3 A flatter Phillips curve
1.3.1 Predictions of the model
Non vertical long run Phillips curve
The long run version of (1.12) implies a flatter long-run Phillips curves, and
it is no longer vertical or nearly vertical as without turnover:
p¯i = κ1− βδ Y˜
When δ is smaller than 1, κ increases slightly. However the increasing effect
on the denominator (1 − βδ) largely dominates. This means that long run
inflation will depend less strongly on the long run output gap, and the curve
is not as vertical.
Property 1. In the long run Phillips curve between inflation and output of
the form p¯i = χY˜ , the coefficient χ decreases with turnover ( δ falls):
χ =
(
φ+ α
1− α + σ
)
(1− θ)
θ(1 + φ)
1− θβδ
1− βδ
Because the linear equation is only an approximation of a highly non-
linear model, it is useful to see the impact of turnover on the non linear
long run Phillips Curve. In steady state the price and wage inflation must
be equalized: Π = Π. Taking the steady state in equations (1.8), (1.9) and
(1.10), output can be written in terms of inflation
Lemma 5. The non linear long-run Phillips curve is
(
Y
Y˜
)φ+α
1−α+σ
=
[
1− θβδΠ(1+φ)
1− θβδΠ−1 w(Π)
− 1+φ
−1
]
(1.13)
Figure (1.3) displays the output level Y associated to a long run (annual-
ized, price and wage) inflation Π. When Π = 1, Y = 1 (the flex price case).
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Figure 1.3: Non linear long run Phillips curve for different values of δ
As Π increases, there is a limited output gain, at least to the first order. With
turnover (δ < 1), the long run trade-off is flatter than in the normal case
without. This was true for the linear approximation of the curves around
zero inflation, and it is also true for the non linear case.
Short and middle run
In equation (1.12), the coefficient of the output gap does not fall with more
turnover (a fall in δ). The coefficient κ is (slightly) decreasing in δ, so it
increases when the survival probability falls. The intuition is that with a
lower discount factor, more weight is put on current economic conditions, so
inflation reacts more strongly to current output. However, let us look at two
cases where the Phillips curve would be perceived as flatter. Equation (1.12)
can be iterated forward:
pit = κyt + βδEt [pit+1] = κ
∑
k≥0
(βδ)k Etyt+k
Let us assume that the output gap is serially correlated:
yt = ρyyt−1 + ut
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with ut a mean-zero disturbance. Then we can write inflation as
pit =
κ
(1− ρyβδ)yt
Property 2. The slope of a traditional Phillips Curve displaying only current
inflation and output, pit = κ˜yt , will depend on the ratio
(1− θβδ)
(1− ρyβδ)
As long as ρy > θ (the output gap being more persistent than wages), the
slope will decrease when δ falls (turnover increases).
Let us also look at an estimated New Keynesian Phillips curve with a
restricted β, if the turnover is not accounted for. Using the assumptions
above,
pit − βEt [pit+1] = κyt − β(1− δ)Et [pit+1]
pit − βEt [pit+1] = κ
yt − β(1− δ)∑
k≥1
(βδ)k Etyt+k

Property 3. The estimated slope in this case will be
κ∗ = cov(pit − βEt [pit+1] , yt)
var(yt)
= (1− βρy)(1− ρyβδ)κ
As long as ρy > θ (the output gap being more persistent than wages), the
slope will decrease when δ falls (turnover increases).
This is the case in the empirical estimates of Gali and Gertler (1999),
where they use marginal costs instead of the output gap. They estimate
pit = λmct +βEpit+1. The estimated coefficient of marginal costs, λ, depends
on the assumption about the coefficient of future inflation, β. When this
coefficient is restricted to β = 1, the estimated value of λ is smaller than
when there is no restriction and β.takes a lower value.
Remark We have to assume here that the output gap is more persistent
than sticky wages (ρy > θ) in order to generate a downward bias in the
traditional PC, and the restricted New Keynesian PC. This is not difficult
as ρy ≈ 0.95 in the US for example. However, such an assumption would not
be necessary in a Rotemberg setup. In such a setup, the coefficient κ does
not depend on turnover. Assuming yt = ρyyt−1 + ut as before, (1− ρyβδ)
increases when δ falls, so the traditional and restricted New Keynesian slopes
are always smaller with turnover.
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1.3.2 Empirical results
I rely on data from the OECD to test a wage Phillips curve between inflation
and cyclical unemployment7. I have 21 countries, between 1996 and 2014
(or fewer years for some countries). Cyclical unemployment ut is defined
as unemployment minus the NAIRU, or structural unemployment. Wage
growth is the yearly percentage increase in nominal compensation per worker.
For turnover, I rely on the job tenure survey. While the proportion of worker
who have been in their job for less than a year is not a perfect metrics for
the rate of yearly job turnover, it is nevertheless a relatively good indicator.
Therefore my turnover variable τt is the proportion of worker between 25 and
54 who have been in their job for a year or less.
I run two regressions.8 The first is a short run expectation-based curve:
pit = γ(τt)ut + β(τt)pit+1 + vt
where vt is an error term. γ(τt) is expected to be negative, and decrease
slightly with turnover τt (a slightly steeper curve). β(τt) is positive and
smaller than 1, and it should decrease with τt. In order to test the effect of
turnover on these coefficients, I add the cross terms (τt × ut) and (τt × pit+1)
in the regression. The two estimates are expected to be negative. I also add
time and country fixed effects in the regression. Last, to rule out common
trends in turnover and the coefficients, I also allow a trend in the coefficients.
As such, the equation can be written
pin,t =
αn + αt + γ1un,t + γ2(τn,t × un,t) + γ3(t× un,t)
+βpin,t+1 + β2(τn,t × pin,t+1) + β3(t× pin,t+1) + vn,t
The results are coherent with the predictions of the model. The effect of
turnover on the coefficient of future inflation is negative and significant, as
predicted. And allowing for a trend in the coefficient does not make turnover
insignificant. Contrary to the prediction, the unemployment coefficient in-
creases with turnover (which makes the curve flatter). But this effect was
predicted to be small, and in the data the change is positive but insignificant.
The flatter unemployment coefficient might be caused by less frequent wage
changes as in the menu costs model of Ball and Mazumder (2011): changes
7It as long been argued (see, eg. Gali and Gertler, 1999; or Gali, 2011) that Phillips
curve are easier to estimate with real marginal costs or unemployment than with output
8Consistency of my OLS approach requires that unemployment and turnover are ex-
ogenous. In particular, they cannot be correlated with any lead or lag of the error term
vt – which also captures variations of the desired wage markup. If there is such a correla-
tion, OLS would be inconsistent, and models such as VAR or GMM could control for the
endogeneity issue.
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(1) (2) (3)
pit+1 .40∗∗∗ 0.96 1.26 0.96 110 0.96
(.055)
τt × pit+1 −.061∗∗∗ −.048∗∗
(.017) (.017)
ut −.30∗∗∗ −.089 −.57 −.53 42 96
(.073) (.082)
τt × ut .013 .026 .022 .027
(.021) (.024) (.020) (.024)
τt .045 −.18 .006 −.217
(.11) (.11) (.11) (.11)
time trend Yes Yes
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.1: The NK short run Phillips curve
in wage will be less frequent as inflation and volatility declined over the past
decades.
It is also insightful to look at the case of a restricted β. If the on future in-
flation is restricted to the riskless discount factor (about 0.96 yearly), we can
see that the coefficient on unemployment is reduced to less than a third, from
−0.3 to −0.09. And the effect of turnover on the unemployment coefficient
is magnified under this restriction – in line with my earlier predictions.
Now let us look at the medium run Phillips curve. If unemployment is
serially correlated of order 1, we saw that the Phillips curve could also be
written
pit = γ˜(τt)ut + v˜t
v˜t is the new error term, and γ˜(τt) is predicted to be negative and increasing
(a flatter curve) with turnover τt. As before, I allow for time and country
fixed effects, I include the term (τt× ut) in the regression, which is expected
to be positive. To rule out common trends in turnover and the coefficient, I
again allow a trend in the coefficient. As such, the equation can be written
pin,t = α˜n + α˜t + γ˜1un,t + γ˜2(τn,t × un,t) + γ˜3(t× un,t) + v˜n,t
The effect of turnover on the coefficient is positive, which is consistent
with the predictions. It is not significant at the 10% level, but it is not less
significant when a trend effect is allowed. As such, these results are consistent
with the idea that turnover creates a flatter middle run Phillips curve.
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(1) (2) (3)
ut −.38∗∗∗ −.93 −27
(.07)
τt × ut .035 .032
(.020) (.020)
τt −.15 −.14
(.09) (.095)
time trend Yes
fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Table 1.2: The NK middle run Phillips curve
1.4 Price or inflation targeting?
1.4.1 Turnover and price targeting
As we will see, introducing turnover into a standard New Keynesian model
has strong implications for the optimal Ramsey policy. Let us first define the
aggregate welfare function.
Welfare function
While workers discount future wages with the probability of job turnover,
individuals do not die in my model. Therefore, the aggregate utility function
of the social planner is simply the aggregation of each household’s utility
given in equation (1.1). Using equation (1.5), this is
E0
∑
t≥0
βtU(Ct, Nt(j)) = E0
∑
t≥0
βtY˜ 1−σ

(
Yt
Y˜
)1−σ
1− σ −
1−α
1+φ∆t
(
Yt
Y˜
) 1+φ
1−α
µ
 (1.14)
In terms of intuition, it is easier to look at the optimality of price targeting in
a quadratic setup. Whens steady state distortions are small, the approxima-
tion of (1.14) and (1.11) bring a quadratic approximation that is not different
from the case without turnover. This is because turnover plays no direct role
in the utility function, or the dynamics of the dispersions.
Lemma 6. The second order approximation of the aggregate utility is
U = −∑
t≥0
βt
[
κ˜
(yt − Y¯ )2
2 + (1− α)w
pi2t
2
]
with Y¯ = log Y¯
Y˜
and κ˜ =
(
σ + φ+α1−α
)
(1−θw)(1−θwβ)
θw
1
1+φw 6= κ
21
Contrary to κ, δ does not appear in κ˜, which is exactly the same coefficient
as in the case with no turnover. This is because the distortion is discounted
with the discount factor of the household, where the death shocks play no
role.
Let us also assume cost push shocks in the Phillips curve:
pit = κyt + βδEtpit+1 + ut
with ut the cost push shock, an error term. We allow it to be an AR(1)
process with autocorrelation ρu (ρu = 0 denoting the white noise case).
The optimality of price targeting
Proposition 2. When δ = 1, price targeting is optimal for the Ramsey pol-
icy: even with steady state distortions, the long run optimal level of inflation
is zero; while inflation reacts to cost push shocks in the short run, this is
accompanied by deflation in the future, so that there is full mean reversion of
the price level. In other words, there is long-run price targeting in response
both to long term distortions and short term cost push shocks
When δ < 1, price targeting is no longer optimal: long run inflation is
non zero if there are steady state distortions; in response to cost push shocks,
some deflation in the future offsets the initial response of inflation, but there
is no longer full mean reversion of the price level. In other words, price
targeting does not hold anymore.
The intuition is as follows: in the benchmark, by committing to give
up some discretion in the future, the planner has some extra discretion in
the present correct cost push shocks, or an inefficient steady state. So that
price stability is optimal from today’s perspective, but there is an incentive to
renege tomorrow. With the death shock, firms are less responsive to commit-
ments, so that the current gain in terms of commitment no longer offsets the
inefficiency in the future. Thus, even with a credible commitment, inflation
will always be used to offset cost push shocks or steady state inefficiencies.
To better grasp the logic, it is useful to compare the Ramsey policy,
which is history dependent, to an optimal state dependent policy. While such
a solution is not Ramsey optimal, it features no dynamic inconsistency. We
can call this solutionMarkovian, or Recursively Pareto Optimal as in Brendon
and Ellison (2015). Let us assume that the optimal inflation is a function of
the first-best rate of output and the current cost push shock: pit = p¯i + γpiut.
In such a Markovian setup, the optimal inflation is not zero even without
turnover. This is because the long run Phillips Curve is not vertical without
turnover, and a very little amount of inflation is welfare improving. On
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the other hand, the Ramsey policy in this case is to allocate the current
and future inflation differently. A high inflation is used in the short run, in
exchange for no inflation in the long run. While this is not time-consistent,
it is optimal from today’s point of view. With turnover, the Markov optimal
inflation is higher due to the flatter long run curve. And the Ramsey policy
still uses more inflation in the short run, but not zero in the long run.
In response to cost push shocks, the difference between the Markov and
Ramsey policy is more important. The Ramsey policy commits to offset
current inflation with future disinflation in response to cost push shocks,
and this commitments improves the trade off in the short run. Because the
Markov policy is not history dependent, it cannot promise future disinflation,
and hence mean reversion of the price level. When turnover is introduced,
there is no longer full mean reversion of the price level, but it does not impact
the Markov policy much.
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Figure 1.4: Ramsey and Markov policy in response to wage cost-push shocks
1.4.2 Long run optimal inflation
In this subsection, we derive the optimal steady state inflation implied by
the non-linear model. While a closed form expression was available for the
long run Phillips curve, the optimal level of steady-state inflation (for a
given amount of steady state distortions) can only be defined implicitly. As
such, it is useful to calibrate most of the parameters, to provide a graphical
illustration. As in Gali, let us calibrate α = 0.25, β = 0.99,  = 8, θ = 0.66,
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φ = 0.11 and σ = 0.16. Now we need to find values for δ. Let us consider a
low turnover scenario (δ = 0.95, or an average duration of 5 years) and an
intermediate scenario with δ = 0.90.
It is a well known feature that in the presence of steady state distortions,
the optimal Ramsey policy of the New Keynesian model does not bring a
constant level of inflation. While there is a small output-inflation trade-
off, the Ramsey policy dictates to front-load some of the inflation at the
beginning, with a reduced inflation in the future. This brings the classical
time inconsistency problem: it is optimal to promise zero or low inflation in
the future, while having a higher rate of inflation temporarily. But in the
future, there is an incentive to renege on past promises of low inflation
Thus we have two ways to define the optimal long run inflation. One
is to look at the long run solution of the Ramsey policy: we solve the dy-
namic Ramsey problem, with the discounted utility function and the dynamic
Phillips curve constraints, and look at the long run solution. But this runs
into the issue of inconsistency, and the long run rate of inflation is not optimal
for the current period.
If the aim is to have a constant rate of inflation that is applicable both
to the short and long run, we can instead look at the long run constraints,
and maximize utility subject to them. As such, we are restricting ourselves
to the set of constant inflation rates. Instead of solving the dynamic problem
and restrict to the time-invariance solution, we impose time-invariance before
solving the maximization.
In the case of the time invariant solution, one simply maximizes the per-
period objective function of the social planner (1.5), subject to the long run
output inflation Phillips curve (1.13) and the expression of the long run
dispersion
∆ = (1− θ)w(Π)
(1+φ)
−1
1− θΠ(1+φ)
Intuitively, inflation helps to bring output closer to its first-best level –
but too much inflation reduces output as the curve is non linear – but it
increases the price and wage dispersions, which reduce utility.
L =

1
1−σY
1−σ − 1
µ
1−α
1+φ∆Y
1+φ
1−α
+Φ1
[
ln
(
1−θβδΠ(1+φ)
1−θβδΠ−1 w(Π)
− 1+φ
−1
)
−
(
φ+α
1−α + σ
)
ln Y
]
+Φ2
[(
1− θΠ(1+φ)
)
∆− (1− θ)w(Π) (1+φ)−1
]

As illustrated in figure (1.5), this brings a positive amount of inflation,
even when δ = 1. The optimal inflation increases as δ decreases.
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For the timeless Ramsey policy, we write the full dynamic Lagrangian
(with Yt, Ωt, Kt and Ft renormalized to flex price values).
The social planner maximizes the discounted sum of the per period util-
ities (1.5), subject, in each period, to the recursive expressions of Ft and Kt
(equations 1.8 and 1.9), the ratio Kt
Ft
(equation 1.10), as well as the dynamics
of ∆t (equations 1.11).
Intuitively the trade-offs are similar to the time invariant problem: in-
flation increases output at the first order, but increases the costly price and
wage distortions. However, the fully dynamic setting is different from the
previously static one. The Lagrangian of the problem writes
L =
∑
βt

[
1
1−σY
1−σ
t − 1µt 1−α1+φY
1+φ
1−α
t ∆t
]
+φ1,t
[
Ktw(Πt)
1+φ
−1 − Ft
]
+φ2,t
[
Ft − Y 1−σt − θβδEtFt+1Π−1t+1
]
+φ3,t
[
Kt − Y
1+φ
1−α
t − θβδEtKt+1Πt+1(1+φ)
]
+φ4,t
[
∆t − θ∆t−1Πt(1+φ) − (1− θ)w(Πt)
(1+φ)
−1
]

After taking the first order conditions, we look at the steady state value
of each constraint and multiplier. Figure (1.5) displays the optimal rate of
inflation depending on the amount of steady state distortions, for different
values of δ. When δ = 1, we have the classic result of zero inflation in the
long run, but it increases as this parameter decreases.
Figure 1.5 displays the constant and timeless Ramsey steady state infla-
tion depending on the first-best output Y¯ > 1, for different values of δw. The
constant policy is in blue while the Ramsey policy is in dashed red. With
more frequent death shocks, the optimal level of constant inflation is higher.
When δ = 1, there is a small level of inflation for the constant policy, but
no inflation for the timeless Ramsey policy: this is the optimality of price
stability. However, when death shocks are introduced, the optimal level of
inflation increases with the output gap, for both the constant and timeless
cases. For a large output gap (Y¯ >> 1) and large death shocks, the optimal
annual level of inflation is in the order of 1− 3% annually.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper constructed a New Keynesian model with Calvo wage stickiness,
as well as job turnover. I show how this leads to a Phillips Curve that is
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Figure 1.5: Steady state information without and with turnover
far less forward looking. When looking at a medium run Phillips Curve,
with persistent output or unemployment disturbances, this can account for
a flatter curve. If the coefficient of future inflation is restricted in a standard
NK Phillips Curve, this creates a bias on the estimate of the slope of the
Phillips Curve, and this bias increases with more turnover. This prediction
is tested on OECD data and is not rejected empirically. In the long run, the
Phillips Curve is also flatter, and no longer vertical or near-vertical.
I show how turnover breaks the optimality of price stability. Price stabil-
ity is no longer optimal, and inflation expectations are more anchored than
in traditional Phillips curves. As such the optimal Ramsey policy no longer
targets the price level in response to cost push shocks. If this turnover is
large, and if the steady state distortions are high enough, the optimal level
of inflation can reach 1− 2% annually. In fact, if there was partial price and
wage indexation, the optimal inflation would be higher, or a same amount of
inflation would be rationalized by a lower turnover or steady state distortion.
One fruitful avenue of future research would be to investigate the empirics
in greater details. Phillips curves can be more informative if we don’t impose
the restriction that they are vertical or quasi vertical in the long run. Also, a
cross section of different sectors, and different types of workers - eg, tempo-
rary vs. permanent employees - could provide additional evidence. Another
fruitful avenue could be to endogenise this turnover. In such a case, it might
be affected by the central bank’s decision, and become a policy target.
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Chapter 2
Monopoly, Monopsony,
and the Phillips Curve
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2.1 Introduction
After the 2008 financial crisis, unemployment increased and then fell sharply,
while inflation remained low and positive. The correlation between inflation
and unemployment – the Phillips Curve – is not as strong empirically as it
was before. The Phillips Curve has become flatter, as evidenced by Blanchard
et al. (2015) or Ball and Mazumder (2014).
Policymakers such as Haldane (2016), Kuroda (2017) or the IMF (WEO,
Oct 2017) are hinting towards the labor market as a possible cause for this.
The bargaining power of workers and unions has declined over time in most
countries. As a result, their ability to obtain wage increases might be reduced.
The gig economy, temporary employment, work agencies, and more generally
the increased bargaining power of employers, might be causes of the weaker
link between employment and wage inflation. It is however unclear whether
the impact of these trends is permanent or temporary. To the extent that this
can affect the real wage, are we simply observing a temporary lower nominal
wage growth while the real wage slowly falls? Is this simply a temporary
deflationary pressure? Or does this gig economy have a more fundamental
impact on inflation and the way we think monetary policy?
The interplay between structural reforms – in the goods and labour mar-
ket – and monetary policy has also been debated in the Eurozone. At Sintra
in 2015, ECB President Mario Draghi famously pushed for market reforms
and flexibility as a complement to monetary policy: "Any reforms under-
taken now will in fact have an improved interaction with macroeconomic
stabilisation policies." Is there a role for structural policies to stabilize eco-
nomic activity and inflation, alongside fiscal and monetary policy? Did the
New Deal’s "codes of fair competition" simply create inflationary pressure by
raising prices and wages, or did the reduced competition interact with the
monetary and fiscal expansions? Did market deregulation and the weakening
of unions and collective bargaining in the US and the UK in the 1980s play
a role in their disinflation? By shifting power from workers to firms, did the
German Hartz reforms change the German Phillips curve for good?
This paper argues that the rise in monopsony power – the bargaining
power of employers in the labour market – not only influences the limited
wage growth that has been observed recently, but also has a more profound
impact on the Phillips Curve and on monetary policy.
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Monopsony in the labour market
Literally, monopsony is a market situation in which there is only one buyer,
as opposed to monopoly with only one seller. More generally, it encompasses
the case of an individual buyer facing an elastic supply curve. This could
be the result of a pure monopsony with only one buyer, or a limited number
of buyers (oligopsony). But modern theories of monopsony emphasize the
role of other frictions in the market. In the same way that a one percent
increase in a firm’s price is unlikely to crowd out all consumption, a one
percent reduction in the wage it pays will not crowd all employment.
The candidates for monopsonistic frictions are the same as those for mo-
nopolistic frictions. If workers cannot observe the wage offered by every firm,
or if a supplier cannot observe the price paid by all downstream buyers, there
will be a search friction where it takes time, effort or money to find a new
employer or customer – in the same way that finding a new worker or supplier
can be costly in monopolistic models. In terms of mobility costs, the canoni-
cal Salop or Hotelling model can be used for either monopoly or monopsony.
But one can also assume that employers or buyers are differentiated along
meaningful characteristics, so that they are imperfect substitutes.
Any market, goods or services, could be monopsonistic in theory. In
the goods market, the most common examples are agriculture, mining and
forestry. Cattle, corn, fruits, wood logs are very homogeneous commodities,
used as intermediate inputs for food processing or manufacturing. While the
commodity is very homogeneous, with little room for product differentiation,
and with a large number of small producers, food processing and manufactur-
ing firms are much bigger and more differentiated, giving them more market
power both for their output and input goods.
Traditionally, only a few labour markets were considered monopsonic.
Nurses, policemen, teachers may have only one potential employer: the local
or national government. Even with local governments, monopsony will be
strong if pay is decided at the national or regional level. Company towns
of the Industrial Revolution were another example of monopsonic employers,
providing employment, housing and amenities for the whole town.
But some labour economist have recently argued that monopsony is per-
vasive in other employment markets. With the fall in unionization and col-
lective bargaining, monopoly is losing relevance as a description of the labour
market. The increase in self-employment, flexible and part-time work – the
so called gig economy – has made work more divisible and insecure (Hal-
dane 2017). This divisibility and insecurity is a likely further shift in market
power from workers to employers, making monopsony even more relevant to
understand the labour market.
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Monopsony and the Phillips Curve
This paper formalizes the policymakers’ insight of a link between the gig
economy and the Phillips Curve, by looking at the role that monopsonic
employers can have in the determination of wages and inflation. The New
Keynesian model usually assumes that wages are set by workers or unions
having monopoly power. Individual workers face a labor demand curve that
is not perfectly elastic. Here, I relax the assumption that wages are set by
employees, and I look at the effect of employers setting wages for their em-
ployees. Individual employers face a labor supply curve that is not perfectly
elastic: they have monopsony power.
In the normal wage Phillips Curve with monopoly power, wages are set by
employees (or unions) who face nominal rigidities. When there is inflation,
the nominal wage cannot be fully adjusted. The real wage falls, and labour
demand – hence output – increases. This provides the positive correlation
between inflation and output under the classical monopoly case.
But if wages are set by firms who face nominal rigidities, and there is
inflation, firms cannot adjust their wages fully. The real wage falls, and
labour supply hence output decreases. This provides a Phillips Curve where
the output gap is negatively correlated with wage inflation.
The same would be true in the goods market. If sticky prices are set by
producers, and there is inflation, the markup falls, and demand increases.
But if sticky prices are set by monopsonic consumers (or, possibly, by large
retailers and supermarkets), then the supply of goods by producers will fall
when inflation lowers the price compared to nominal costs.
This paper also studies the interplay of monopoly and monopsony power
in the same market: workers and firms both have limited market power to set
a wage. Instead of one agent choosing the level of employment in response to
the wage set by the other agent, there is a two-stage process for determining
the wage and employment, and there is Nash bargaining in the two stages.
The result is different from monopoly pricing, monopsony pricing or per-
fect competition. As such it can be thought of the general case encompassing
these particular cases. This setup can be used to study a gradual shift in
bargaining power from workers to firms. As the bargaining power of firms
increases, the Phillips Curve flattens, up to a point when the slope is inverted.
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Related literature
While different authors have studied and provided explanations for the re-
cently observed flatter Phillips Curve, this paper is the first attempt to link
it with monopsony power. Ball and Mazumder (2011) suggest that with
menu costs, price changes will be less frequent when inflation is low, and the
resulting Phillips Curve will be flatter. Blanchard (2016) relies on anchored
inflation expectations. The idea of a global Phillips Curve – inflation reacting
to global not domestic conditions – has also been floated (eg. Carney, 2017).
While the labour market has been highlighted as a possible driver of the flat-
ter Phillips Curve (see Haldane, 2017 or chapter 2 of the October 2017 World
Economic Outlook), no proper model has been suggested yet. This paper at-
tempts to provide a sound theoretical link between employment conditions
and the Phillips Curve.
In the labour market, monopsony (or oligopsony) has been highlighted as
a a possible explanation for different observed features. Monopsony can offer
a simple explanation for the size-wage correlation (Brown and Medoff, 1989;
Green, Machin and Manning 1996): large firms have to pay higher wages to
attract a larger labour supply, since the labour supply is not perfectly elastic.
Also, under monopsony, minimum wage laws are not necessarily detrimental
to employment, because a higher wage will increase labour supply.1 For
example, Manning (1996) found that equal pay laws in the UK significantly
increased women’s earnings, but without any fall in their employment level.
Monopsony has also been studied outside of the labour market. Food
processing industries, and saw mills are typical example of oligopsonic buyers
(see, among others, Schroeter 1988, Just and Chern 1980, Murray 1995 or
Bergman and Brännlund, 1995). Recently, Morlacco (2018) documented that
French firms exercise significant buyer power in their foreign input market:
they curb the demand of foreign inputs in order to keep prices low. However,
no paper has studied the impact of monopsony on the Phillips Curve.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 builds a model of monopsony:
workers do not substitute perfectly from one firm to another and this gives
market power to firms. A Phillips Curve with monopsony is then derived.
Section 3 combines monopoly power and monopsony power in a model of
bargaining, so as to build a generalised Phillips Curve. Section 4 discusses the
results: their robustness to alternative assumptions, as well as the historical
and current relevance for monetary policy.
1With monopsony there is no notion of unemployment where workers would like to
work more given the prevailing wage. Instead there is rationing: firms could hire more
given the low real wage but choose not to. Nevertheless it leads to underemployment.
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2.2 The Phillips curve with monopsony
Before introducing a full model of bargaining, I develop a smaller toy model
of monopsonistic competition, as the analogue of monopolistic competition.
2.2.1 Flexible steady state
Households
I assume a continuum of firms on the interval [0, 1], indexed by i. A worker
(or a household) can allocate its time (or the time of its members) across
different employers. By allocating Li to each employer i, the total wage
received is
∫ 1
i=0WiLi with Wi the wage in firm i. 2
The consumptions good Ct is assumed to be homogeneous at a price Pt.
The representative households maximizes a separable utility function
max E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt [u(Ct)− v(Lt)]
Disutility of work depends on an aggregate effective labour supply Lt. Lt is
a convex function of each Lt(i), the labour supplied to each firm i :
Lt =
[∫ 1
0
Lt(i)1+1/η.di
] 1
1+1/η
η = ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi |L,C is the wage elasticity of labour supply. 3
The household faces a budget constraint
PtCt +QtBt = Bt−1 +
∫ 1
0
Wt(i)Lt(i)di+
∫ 1
0
Dt(i)di
From every firm i, the household receives a dividend Dt(i), and a wage com-
pensation Wt(i)Lt(i) for supplying Lt(i) to firm i. New bonds Bt can be
bought or sold at price Qt, the stochastic discount factor of the household.
The Euler equation pins down the stochastic discount factor
Qt = Etβ
Pt
Pt+1
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
(2.1)
2Assuming that agents share their time across different employers is a simplification.
But it can be rationalised if agents have a probability to work for one employer or another.
In Section 5, I formalize this probabilistic micro-foundation
3See Section 5 for a robustness check on non constant elasticities
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The first order condition for each Lt(i) brings
u′(C)
P
Wi =
(
Li
L
)1/η
v′(L) (2.2)
If we introduce the wage aggregate W =
[∫ 1
0 W
1+η
i .di
] 1
1+η , this pins down the
aggregate labour supply and firm i’s own labour supply curve
W
P
= v
′(L)
u′(C) = MRS
(
Li
L
)
=
(
Wi
W
)η
Firms
The representative firm i takes prices as given, and has a production function
Yi = F (Li). It maximizes its profits P.Yi−Wi.Li subject to the labour supply
curve
(
Li
L
)
=
(
Wi
W
)η
. The FOC with respect to Li is P.F ′(Li)−(1+1/η)Wi =
0. The optimal wage is a markup below the marginal product of labour:
Wi =
P.F ′(Li)
1 + 1/η
W
P
= MPL1 + 1/η
Let us look at flexible prices and wages. Under monopolistic competition, the
wage is equal to the MPL and is a markup over the MRS. Here, the wage is
equal to the MRS and is a markup below the MPL. Hence this is not a state
of unemployment where workers would like to work more given the current
wage. Instead, jobs are rationed and firms could hire more given the wage.
While there is technically no unemployment, there is still underemployment.
To some extent, it is more similar to monopolistic competition in the
goods market, where the real wage would the MRS and below the MPL
(since prices are a markup over marginal costs in that case).
2.2.2 Calvo wage rigidity
Let me assume that the firm faces a Calvo fairy when setting its wage: only
a fraction (1 − θ) of firms can reset their wage in each period. The wage is
set to maximize the discounted profits subject to the labour supply curve:
max
W ∗t (i)
Et
+∞∑
k=0
(θβ)ku
′(Ct+k
Pt+k
[Pt+kF (Lt+k(i))−W ∗t (i)Lt+k(i)] (2.3)
st.
(
Lt+k(i)
Lt+k
)
=
(
W ∗t (i)
Wt+k
)η
(2.4)
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Around a zero-inflation steady state, the log linear approximation of the
optimal Calvo wage (dropping the markup) is
w∗t = (1− βθ)
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k[pt +mplt+k|t]
From the worker’s problem, mrs = w − p and since F (Li) = L1−αi ,
mplt+k|t = −αlt+k|t = mplt+k + αη(wt+k − w∗t )
Using this expression of the real wage, and standard algebra (see appendix),
an expression for the wage inflation pit can be derived:
Theorem 1. Monopsonic Phillips Curve: With monopsony, there is a
negative correlation between inflation and real economic activity
pit =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
( −1
1 + αη
)
(mrst −mplt) + βE[pit+1] (2.5)
(1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
comes from the Calvo modeling, while (mrst−mplt) is a mea-
sure of real economic activity that is also standard in New Keynesian models.
Monopsony only plays a role through η and the negative sign.4
In the normal wage Phillips Curve with monopoly power, wages are set by
employees who face nominal rigidities. When there is inflation, they cannot
adjust their wage fully. The real wage falls, and labour demand hence output
increases. This provides the positive correlation between inflation and output
under the classical monopoly case.
But if wages are set by firms who face nominal rigidities, and there is
inflation, firms cannot adjust their wages fully. The real wage falls, and
labour supply hence output decreases. This provides a Phillips Curve where
the output gap is negatively correlated with wage inflation.
In a sense, monopoly and monopsony can be thought of two limiting cases
of a bargaining between a union with some monopoly power and a firm with
some monopsony power. Monopoly could be the limiting case where all the
4The monopolistic New Keynesian Phillips Curve with sticky wages is typically written
pit =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
(
1
1 + φ
)
(mrst −mplt) + βE[pit+1]
with φ the disutility curvature and  the elasticity of substitution between labour types.
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power and surplus accrues to the union/workers, while monopsony would be
the situation where all the power and surplus accrues to the firm. Looking
at the intermediate case can then provide insights about what happens when
there is a gradual shift of power from one side to the other.
In the next section, I attempt to build such a generalised bargaining
model that encompasses monopoly and monopsony as the two limiting cases.
2.3 Phillips curve with Nash bargaining
I construct a model with both monopoly power for workers and monopsony
power for firms. I assume that a firm employs a continuum of workers, and
a worker works with a continuum of firms. Each pair of worker and firm is a
match. I assume a two-stage process: in the second stage, there is bargaining
over the match-specific surplus, while the first-stage bargaining shares the
total surplus of the worker and the firm. The imperfect substitutability of
firms and workers takes place in the second stage but not the first stage.
The result of the second stage is to create a labour bargain curve L(w) that
shares the surplus of the match. In the first stage, the bargaining maximizes
the joint aggregate surplus, subject to the labour bargain curve. 5
I assume a modified version of Manning’s (1987) model:6 In the first
stage, the firm and worker bargain over the wage, and in the second stage
they bargain over employment. Hence the second stage provides a function
L(w): for each wage there is a bargained level of employment. But Nash
bargaining is most often done over a payment or a rate, not a quantity. It
makes more sense to assume that the agents in the second stage behave as
if they were bargaining over the wage, for a given employment.
If there is a project of size L, the firm and worker bargain over the wage
compensationWL over a wage or a payoff makes more sense than bargaining
over quantities. This provides a function w(L), a wage for each amount of
work, which implicitly defines the reciprocal function L(w).
5There is no commitment between the two stages because the agents bargain over a
different surplus in each stage, and it is as if the agents were different in the two stages.
From the first stage point of view, the second stage is done by a representative firm and
worker not the the first stage agents. One way to think about it could be that the second
stage features an individual worker and an individual employer, while the first stage would
be conducted by a sectoral union and a sectoral business group.
6See section 5 for a critical discussion of this model, and a comparison with the literature
on collective bargaining in general, and in particular the differences with Manning’s model.
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The surplus of the match
I need to define the default option for the firm and the union. If they dis-
agree, I assume that they do not work at all with each other. When a union
decides on a strike, the ultimate default option is the indefinite strike, and
the ultimate default option of the employer is to shut down the company
completely. Hence they will bargain over the total employer and employee
surpluses, not merely (MPL−W ) and (W −MRS).7 8
The figure below illustrates this. The figure plots the marginal product
of labour and marginal rate of substitution of the employer and employee.
For a given L, the wage W is not set to split the surplus B − C. Instead,
the wage bill WL is set to to split the total surplus represented by the area
OABC (left figure). In other words, the wage does not split the difference
between the marginal product of labour and marginal rate of substitution,
but the difference between the average product of labour and the average
rate of substitution (right figure). The wage curve (in blue) lies between the
average product of labour and average rate of substitution curves.
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7This alternative possibility would be more likely in an anonymous market where agents
do not observe the total effort, hence the default option of their opponent. See Section 5,
for a discussion of the alternative modeling.
8This issue of total vs marginal surplus is often muted in the matching literature when
the production and disutility functions are assumed to be linear.
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2.3.1 Model and flexible equilibrium
I introduce the representative production and disutility functions
Assumption 1. (1) Production is a function of a concave labour aggregate
F (L) = L1−α with L1−1/ =
∫ 1
i=0
L
1−1/
i di (2.6)
(2) Labour disutility is a function of a convex labour aggregate
v(L) = L1+φ with L1+1/η =
∫ 1
j=0
L
1+1/η
j dj (2.7)
(3) Concavity of the production function requires 1 > α > 1/ > 0;
Convexity of the disutility requires φ > 1/η > 0 9
payoff functions in the two stage
I can now introduce the payoff functions of the agents in the two stages.
Lemma 7. First Stage
In the first stage, the payoffs of the firm and worker depend on the aggre-
gate labour Li and wage Wi that they agree together. Respectively,
pf (Li,Wi) = F (Li)− WiLi
P
and pw(Li,Wi) =
WiLi
P
− v(Li)
u′(C) (2.8)
A worker working an aggregate L has a marginal disutility of working Li
with firm i: ∂v
∂Li
=
(
Li
L
)1/η
v′(L) while a firm employing an aggregate L and Li
from worker i has a marginal product with him writing ∂F
∂Li
=
(
Li
L
)−1/
F ′(L)
Hence, conditional on aggregate L, the total surplus of the match is
S(Li|L) =
∫ Li
l=0
( l
L
)−1/
MPL−
(
l
L
)1/η
MRS
 .dl
S(Li|L) = 
− 1
L
1−1/
i
L−1/
MPL− η
η + 1
L
1+1/η
i
L1/η
MRS
Let me now write the second stage payoffs, which depend on match specific
employment Li and wage Wi, as well as aggregate labour L
9This provides the concavity/convexity of the production/disutility with respect to
each Li or Lj , but also with respect to the number of varieties
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Lemma 8. Second Stage
In the second stage, the payoff of the firm (in real terms) is
P˜f (Li,Wi|L) = 
− 1
L
1−1/
i
L−1/
MPL− WiLi
P
(2.9)
The worker’s payoff in the second stage is, in terms of the goods
P˜w(Li,Wi|L) = WiLi
P
− η
η + 1
L
1+1/η
i
L1/η
MRS (2.10)
Second stage bargaining
In each match, the wage bargaining is as follows: for each level of employment
Li in the match, the wage bill WiLi maximizes the Nash product
max
Wi
P˜w(Li,Wi|L)γP˜f (Li,Wi|L)1−γ
γ and (1− γ) are the bargaining power of the employee and the firm respec-
tively. As a result, the wage bill is a weighted average of the total production
and disutility in the match.
Theorem 2. Labour bargain curve
The second stage defines the relationship between Wi and Li in the match,
for a given level of employment L (and hence given MRS and MPL).
Wi
P
= (1− γ) η
η + 1
(
Li
L
)1/η
MRS + γ 
− 1
(
Li
L
)−1/
MPL (2.11)
and the labour bargain elasticity is e = ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi |W,L
This model does not boil down exactly to the usual model of monopoly,
or the monopsony one I have introduced previously, when γ = 1 or γ = 0.
When γ = 1, Wi
P
= 
−1
(
Li
L
)−1/
MPL = 
−1MMPL(Li). In a classical
model of monopolistic unions, the firm would take the wage and equalize the
marginal match product of labour with the wage. However, here, the worker
is able to extract more than his MMPL, because he is able to capture the
surplus that he generates for the firm. From a contract theory point of view,
this is price discrimination instead of linear pricing.
Similarly, when γ = 0, Wi
P
= η
η+1
(
Li
L
)1/η
MRS = η
η+1MMRS(Li). The
wage is below the worker’s MMRS, because the firm captures the total
surplus generated by the match.
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First stage bargaining
Having derived a match specific labour bargain curve, I can now turn to the
first stage of the bargaining. In the match bargaining, each worker is facing
one type of firm, and each firm is facing one type of worker. However, in
the first stage, when the wage and employment is decided, workers are now
facing the continuum of firms, and firms face the continuum of workers.
The payoff of the worker now is WiLi
P
− v(Li)
u′(C) and the payoff of the firm is
F (Li)− WiLiP . The Nash bargaining maximizes the joint product, subject to
the labour bargain curve:
max
Wi,Li
[
γ ln
(
WiLi
P
− v(Li)
u′(C)
)
+ (1− γ) ln
(
F (Li)− WiLi
P
)]
(2.12)
st
Wi
P
= (1− γ) η
η + 1
(
Li
L
)1/η
MRS + γ 
− 1
(
Li
L
)−1/
MPL
This yields an efficient, symmetric equilibrium when prices are flexible
Theorem 3. Irrespective of γ, the flexible symmetric equilibrium always has
MPL = MRS =
(
1 + 1
e
)
W
P
(2.13)
e = ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi |W,L, the labour bargain elasticity around the steady state, satisfies
1
e
=
(1−γ)
η+1 − γ−1
(1− γ) η
η+1 + γ

−1
or 1
e+ 1 =
(1− γ)
η + 1 −
γ
− 1
We can look at three particular values for γ
Property 4. (1) When γ = 1, e = − and we have perfect monopoly:
MPL = MRS =
(
1− 1

)
W
P
and Wi
W
=
(
Li
L
)−1/
(2) When γ = 0, e = η and we have perfect monopsony:
MPL = MRS =
(
1 + 1
η
)
W
P
and Wi
W
=
(
Li
L
)1/η
(3) When γ
−1 =
(1−γ)
η+1 , the bargain is isomorphic to perfect competition:
W
P
= MPL = MRS and labour in a match is perfectly elastic: 1
e
= 0
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It is first worthy to note that the MPL and MRS are equal, but can
differ from the wage. This is due to the assumption of bargaining over the
total surplus. As a result, since the wage lies between the average product of
labour and average disutility of work, it can be above or below. Of course,
this might no longer be efficient with capital or entry in the labour market:
the incentives to invest or search for a job would be altered. But here, as we
abstract from this, the outcome is always efficient.
Second, this model, which allows the bargaining power to vary between
the union and the firm, is able to encompass monopoly and monopsony as the
two limiting cases. As the bargaining shifts smoothly in the interior of the
interval, the slope of the Phillips curve smoothly changes sign. Also, with
this model, perfect competition and flexible prices can be thought as the
case where the relative bargaining power of employers and employees exactly
offsets their relative market power coming from the imperfect substitutability.
2.3.2 The wage bargain Phillips curve
Under flexible wages, the timing of the game didn’t really matter. The second
stage featured a bargaining over the wage Wi (or compensation WiLi) in the
atomistic match i, for a given match labour Li. Since wages were flexible,
they could be agreed on in the second stage as a normal wage bargaining.
However, this isn’t as straightforward in the case of rigid wages. I have to
assume that agents in the second stage behave as if they could bargain over
the wage, despite the sticky wage having been decided in the first stage. So
the second stage bargaining described previously will still apply when wages
are rigid, and the bargained wage is a weighted average of the MPL and
MRS. Since it provides a relationship between the wage and the labour in
the match, this relationship can then be used to provide a level of employment
Li for each wage Wi. 10
Payoff functions and Nash problem
With Calvo wage rigidity, the firm and worker maximize a joint product of
payoffs. The discounted payoff of the worker and the firm are, respectively
Pw =
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
(
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
WtLt+k|t − v(Lt+k|t)
)
Pf =
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)ku
′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
(
Pt+kF (Lt+k|t)−WtLt+k|t
)
10See section 5 for a further discussion of this assumption
40
Hence the maximization problem is11
max
Wt
P γwP
1−γ
f st
∂ lnWi
∂ lnLi
|W,L = 1
e
First order approximation
I take the first order condition with respect toWt, and around a zero inflation
equilibrium, I can use MRS = MPL =
(
1 + 1
e
)
W
P
. (see appendix)
The log linear approximation around the steady stare becomes
γ
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k (w
∗
t − pt+k −mrst+k|t)∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
(
1− Pv(L)
u′(C)WL
)
=(1− γ)
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k (w
∗
t − pt+k −mplt+k|t)∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
(
PF (L)
WL
− 1
) (2.14)
Around the steady state, the denominators in the previous equations
are constant, and can be greatly simplified under the assumption of constant
curvature for the production and disutility function. This constant curvature
is also helpful for an expression of the labour supplied at time t+ k to a firm
whose wage was set at time t (and the labour demanded at t + k from a
worker whose wage was set at time t).
Lemma 9. Under the assumption that F (L) = L1−α and v(L) = L1+φ,
(1) The steady state labour satisfies
PF (L)
WL
− 1 =
1
e
+ α
1− α and 1−
Pv(L)
u′(C)WL =
φ− 1
e
1 + φ
(2 )At time (t+ k), the log linear approximation of the MRS and MPL is
mrst+k|t = mrst+k + eφ(w∗t − wt+k)
mplt+k|t = mplt+k − eα(w∗t − wt+k)
Taking logs of equation (2.13) in theorem 2, the log of the real wage is
wt+k − pt+k = (1− γ˜)mrst+k + γ˜mplt+k
with γ˜ = γ

−1
(1−γ) η
η+1+γ

−1
= γ

−1
e
e+1
All this combined, the log linear approximation provides a Phillips Curve
11Gertler and Trigari (2009) also have a model of bargaining with staggered wage ad-
justments, and their bargaining also maximizes a joint product of two discounted payoffs
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Theorem 4. Nash Bargaining Phillips Curve
pit =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
λ (mrst −mplt) + βpit+1 (2.15)
with a slope coefficient
λ =
γ2(1+φ)(1+1/e)
φ−1/e

−1 +
(1−γ)2(1−α)(1+1/e)
α+1/e
η
η+1
γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α)
(−1
e
)
The coefficient (1−βθ)(1−θ)
θ
simply comes from Calvo rigidities, and is com-
mon in any Calvo New Keynesian model. (mrst −mplt) = (φlt + σct) + αlt
the measure of real economic activity, is also standard in monetary models.
Here the relative power of monopoly and monopsony is in the coefficient λ.
Property 5. From property (1), we have φ > 1/η and α > 1/, so
−α < 1/e < φ. Hence the slope of the Phillips Curve solely depends on
−1
e
=
γ
−1 − (1−γ)η+1
(1− γ) η
η+1 + γ

−1
(1) If γ
−1 >
(1−γ)
η+1 (monopolistic competition),
−1
e
> 0, the slope is positive
(2) If (1−γ)
η+1 >
γ
−1 (monopsonistic case),
−1
e
> 0, the slope is negative
(3) When γ
−1 =
(1−γ)
η+1 , the Phillips curve is flat
This model provides a tractable reduced-form Phillips Curve that encom-
passes both monopoly and monopsony power, and depends on the relative
bargaining power of workers and firms. With both monopoly and monopsony
power, the sign of the slope depends on the relative bargaining power of the
two sides, as well as the built-in market power that arises from the imperfect
substitutability of employees for firms and jobs for workers. 12
It is easy to verify that the cases γ = 1 and γ = 0 give the normal
monopoly and monopsony Phillips curves respectively. As with other Calvo
models of the Phillips Curve, this is only an approximation valid around a
zero inflation steady state where output is equal to its natural level. 13
12If one side does not have market power at all ( or η is infinite), then a shift of
bargaining power would not change the sign of the slope, but only its magnitude
13But here the natural rate of output around which the log linear approximation is done
is also the first-best efficient outcome
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2.4 Applications
2.4.1 Interpretation
This paper has focused on monopsony in the labour market rather than the
goods market, because it is likely to be more prevalent, and has been more
documented in the micro literature. But there is little doubt that large
supermarket chains have monopsony power over some producers. After all,
some are franchise networks with a large central purchasing body – which
gives them a larger bargaining power with producers. Monopsony power has
also been documented between producers and suppliers in some industries.
Mathematically, it would give very similar predictions as monopsony in
the labour market: if the buyers sets a rigid price, inflation will lower the
real price, and sellers will reduce their supply. It would also be possible to
have monopsony and bargaining both in the goods and labour market. As in
a New Keynesian model with nominal rigidities in monopolistic goods and
labour market, a monopsonistic version would have price and wage inflation
depending on the output gap and the real wage.
Structural reforms and inflation
While there is a strong sense among policymakers that structural reforms can
have lasting impacts on inflation, this is not a direct feature of the standard
New Keynesian model. In the standard NK model, pro-competitive reforms
in the goods and labour market tend to reduce the price and wage markup.
While this reduces inflation in the short run as real prices and real wages
fall with the markups, there is no long term effect when the markups have
fallen. On the contrary, anti-competitive reforms will be inflationary, but
only in the short run as the price or wage markups increase. Unless these
reforms affect structural elasticities of substitution, a boom (or a downturn)
will always have the same inflationary (or deflationary) effects.
This article provides a link between structural reforms and inflation.
From a situation where sellers (workers and producers) have relatively more
power, pro-competitive reforms will make the Phillips Curve flatter. Hence,
booms and bust will be less inflationary (or deflationary). Starting from a
monopsonic situation where buyers have more powers, shifting even more
power to buyers makes the economy more monopsonic and less competitive.
At the same time, this would steepen a negatively sloped Phillips Curve
where booms are deflationary. It is unlikely that a predominantly monop-
sonic situation would ever occur, hence a shift of power from sellers to buyers
would always be pro-competitive and flatten the Phillips Curve.
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Some historic events tend to document this link between structural poli-
cies and long term inflation
The New Deal in the US famously featured anti-competitive policies,
alongside monetary and fiscal expansions. The National Recovery Adminis-
tration aimed at eliminating cut-throat competition. In each sector, industry,
labour and the government would write "codes of fair competition" to reduce
"destructive competition". This included minimum wages, maximum hours,
and minimum prices and standards for sold prices. The National Labor Rela-
tions Act also increased the bargaining power of unions in the private sector,
guaranteeing a right to collective action and requiring employers to engage
with unions. While it has been argued by some that these policies slowed
down the economic recovery, there is little doubt over their inflationary effect.
Disinflation in the 1980s was largely due to monetary and/or fiscal con-
traction, but it did coincide with large, pro-competitive deregulation reforms.
These reforms effectively removed many of the neo-corporatist policies imple-
mented in European countries after World War II, where unions, producers
and governments tended to weaken competition. Large sectors were priva-
tized or deregulated in countries like the US, the UK or France. In the labour
market, the UK was the most prominent in reducing the power and influence
of unions: Margaret Thatcher broke the Coal Miners’ strike, and unions be-
came more heavily regulated. Union power was also weakened under Ronald
Reagan in the US.
More recently, Germany in the 2000s has seen the impact of structural
reforms on inflation. The Hartz IV reform lowered long term unemploy-
ment benefits, and imposed stricter job search condition on the claimants,
while the Hartz II package created minijobs that were paid substantially less
than normal jobs. These minijobs, often part time jobs or secondary jobs,
facilitate gig employment, and has shifted the bargaining power towards em-
ployers in some sectors. At the same time, Germany has seen very low wage
inflation compared to its neighbours, despite high output and very low un-
employment. The idea of adopting the Hartz reforms in southern Europe is
regularly floated, to improve its competitiveness and lower wage inflation.
This tends to suggest that structural reforms, by reducing the power of
producers and sellers, makes the Phillips Curve flatter, making booms (bust)
less inflationary (deflationary). Hence this is likely to be beneficial in normal
times, especially combined with monetary or fiscal expansions, because it
lowers their cost in terms of inflation. However, if an economy is at or close
to the Zero Lower Bound, structural reforms will not only put deflationary
pressure in the short run. It also makes fiscal and monetary policy less
inflationary, so that it is harder to steer the economy away from the ZLB.
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2.4.2 Monetary policy in a world of monopsony
How is monopsony power relevant for monetary policy? What would happen
of the Phillips Curve became flat, or if its slope coefficient became negative?
It is possible to look at this question using reduced form equations. For
simplicity, I assume monopsony in the goods market instead in this subsec-
tion, because standard Euler equations and Taylor rules rely on price – not
wage – inflation14. Since monopsony in the goods market is the symmetric
analogue of the labour market, the negatively sloped Phillips Curve remains.
The Euler equation (2.1) can be approximated in log linear terms:
yt = − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1 − ρ) + Etyt+1 (2.16)
while the monopsony Phillips curve, in reduced form, is
pit = −κyt + Etpit+1 + ut (2.17)
We can also assume a Taylor rule in inflation and output:
it = ρ+ φpipit + φyyt + vt (2.18)
Combining them in matrix form[
yt
pit
]
= AT
[
Etyt+1
Etpit+1
]
+BT
[
ut
vt
]
with AT = Ω
[
σ 1− βφpi
−σκ −κ+ β(σ + φy)
]
, BT = Ω
[ −φpi −1
σ + φy −κ
]
and
Ω = 1
σ+φy−κφpi
Determinacy requires that the two eigenvalues of AT are lower than 1,15
or alternatively that the eigenvalues of (AT − Id) are negative. As in Bullard
and Mitra (2002), the trace and determinant conditions for a 2x2 matrix are
−Ω [(φy + σ(1− β)− κφpi) + (φy(1− β)− κ(φpi − 1))] < 0 (2.19)
Ω (φy(1− β)− κ(φpi − 1)) > 0 (2.20)
Because of the minus sign in front of κ, the conditions for determinacy of
the equilibrium are more complicated compared to the normal monopoly case
studied in Bullard and Mitra, and can be reversed. There are two cases.16
14If the utility function is such that the MRS is constant, then the two inflation rates are
equalized. But in general it is not the case and expressions would be more complicated.
15Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
16With a positive sign, Ω = (σ + φy + κφpi)−1 > 0. If [φy(1− β) + κ(φpi − 1)] > 0 is
satisfied, then [(φy + σ(1− β)− κφpi) + φy(1− β)− κ(φpi − 1)] > 0 is also always satis-
fied, hence [φy(1− β) + κ(φpi − 1)] > 0 is a sufficient condition for determinacy
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(1) If κ is not too high, Ω is positive and the determinacy conditions are
φpi < 1 +
1− β
κ
φy φpi <
1
2 +
φy + (1− β)(φy + σ)
2κ (2.21)
The interpretation of the
(
φpi < 1 + 1−βκ φy
)
condition is the exact reverse
of the normal monopoly case. Under monopoly, the condition implies that if
the inflation permanently increased by one point, the nominal interest rate
through the the φpi and φy coefficient increases by more than 1, hence the real
interest rate increases, and this creates a self correcting deflationary pressure.
With monopsony, a permanent increase inflation by one percent has to
lead to a smaller increase in the nominal interest rate, so that the real interest
falls. The fall in the real interest rate is expansionary in terms of output in
the Euler equation, but because of the negatively-slopped Phillips Curve, the
increased output is deflationary and stabilizes inflation.
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Figure 2.1: Determinacy zone: the inflation coefficient is the lower right zone
The other condition has a less straightforward interpretation. If the cen-
tral bank does not react to the output gap (φy = 0), then the inflation
coefficient in the Taylor rule has to be very low: φpi < 12 +
(1−β)σ
2κ . The coeffi-
cient is much lower than 1. On the other hand, if the central bank responds
to output (φy > 0), higher values of φpi, potentially above 1, can be sustained.
While monopsony probably isn’t a good description for the economy as
a whole, monetary policy after the Great Recession has been much more
output-sensitive than inflation-sensitive, in line with the model’s predictions.
(2) For a very high κ, then Ω < 0 and the inequalities in eq (2.21) are
flipped: φpi > 1 + 1−βκ φy and φpi >
1
2 +
φy+(1−β)(φy+σ)
2κ
For κ→∞, this becomes φpi > 1 and φpi > 1/2. Hence the flexible limit
of the model has the same determinacy conditions as a normal flexible model.
46
2.5 Robustness of the model
2.5.1 Labour aggregates
Microfoundations for constant elasticities
How can we model monopsony in the labour market? There needs to be
imperfect substitutability between different firms or occupations. Of course
most employees only work with one company – the gig economy where an
employee faces many employers is still a tiny fraction of the workforce.
But even if individuals perfectly substitute, there can still be imperfect
aggregate substitutability. Take the Hotelling or Salop model: firms are
located on a line or a circle, and a mass of consumers is evenly distributed on
the line or circle. Workers can choose where they want to work, but face a
transportation cost linked to their distance from the firm. Each worker only
works for a single firm, but since workers are distributed over a continuous
interval, some will work for one company and others for another company.
A firm will attract more labour by paying a higher wage, but this will not
attract the whole mass of workers: there is imperfect substitutability.
Instead of using the Salop or Hotelling model, I will try to remain as
close as possible to the usual monopolistic CES setup, because a CES can be
modeled as the aggregate of probabilistic individuals. Assume N firms. An
individual j can allocate his time among the N firms. But for each firm i,
he has a particular distaste ai,j for the job. The disutility of working is
v
(
N∑
i=1
ai,jLi,j
)
where Li,j is labour supplied by j to firm i. There is perfect substitutability
across jobs. The worker maximizes a separable utility
u
(∑N
i=1wiLi,j
P
)
− v
(
N∑
i=1
ai,jLi,j
)
Worker j chooses to work (only) for the company with the highest (wi/ai,j).
If the (ai,j) are independent random variables, then the number of workers
in firm i is the probability that it has the highest ratio for one individual:
Li = P [wi/ai,j > max
k 6=i
(wk/ak,j)]
Now, if the (ai,j) follow an appropriate Frechet distribution as in Eaton and
Kortum (2002), this can provide a CES structure: Li
Lk
=
(
Wi
Wk
)η
with a one to
one mapping between η and the parameters of the Frechet distribution.
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Labour aggregates with non constant elasticities
Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution for the labour aggregates,
the production function and the disutility function makes the model more
tractable, but it is not essential. I can assume the more general form for the
production function and its corresponding labour aggregate:17 Y = F (L)
with
L = g−1
[∫ 1
i=0
g(Li)di
]
I can assume a general labour disutility function with its corresponding
labour aggregate:18 v(L) with
L = h−1
[∫ 1
j=0
h(Lj)dj
]
The match product of labour and match rate of substitution are now
TMPL(Li) =
g(Li)
g′(L)MPL and TMRS(Lj) =
h(Lj)
h′(L)MRS
Property 6. Define
(
η, , α¯, φ¯, α˜, φ˜
)
locally by 1
η
= Lh′(L)
h(L) −1, 1 = 1− Lg
′(L)
g(L) ,
α¯ = 1− LF ′(L)
F (L) , φ¯ =
Lv′(L)
v(L) − 1, α˜ = −LF
′′(L)
F ′(L) and φ˜ =
Lv′′(L)
v′(L)
(1) Theorem (3) is unaffected: the steady state expression of the wage
and the labour bargain elasticity with η and  remain unchanged
(2) The Phillips curve in eq (2.15) simply has a modified slope coefficient
λ¯ =
γ2(1+φ¯)
φ¯−1/e
1+1/e
1−1/ +
(1−γ)2(1−α¯)
α¯+1/e
1+1/e
1+1/η
γ
(
1 + φ¯
)
φ˜−1/e
φ¯−1/e + (1− γ) (1− α¯) α˜+1/eα¯+1/e
(−1
e
)
Since
(
φ¯− 1/e
)
,
(
φ˜− 1/e
)
, (α¯ + 1/e) and (α˜ + 1/e) are all strictly posi-
tive19, the sign of the slope still only depends on
(−1
e
)
.
2.5.2 The bargaining assumptions
relation with the literature and the Manning model
While there is no existing model that combines monopolistic and monopson-
istic power together, the labour literature on collective bargaining has some
17Both F (·) and g(·) are increasing, concave function satisfying F (0) = g(0) = 0. Con-
cavity of production requires that F (g−1(·)) is also concave, which is a stronger condition
18Both v(·) and h(·) are increasing, convex function satisfying v(0) = h(0) = 0. Con-
vexity of disutility requires that v(h−1(·)) is also convex, which is a stronger condition
19Concavity and convexity assumptions on production and disutility require φ¯ > 1/η,
φ˜ > 1/η, α¯ > 1/ and α˜ > 1/
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related elements, in micro models with just one firm and one union. Some-
times called a bilateral monopoly it is de-facto a monopoly and a monopsony.
In the right-to-manage model of Nickell and Andrews (1983), the union
and the firm bargain over a wage in the first stage, but in the second stage
the firm is free to choose employment as it sees fit. But this implies that the
second-stage labour demand curve gives no role to bargaining. McDonald
and Solow (1981) consider a model where the union and the firm bargain
simultaneously over wages and employment, but the simultaneity doesn’t
allow for a second stage labour curve. Manning (1987) builds a two stage
model where the firm and the union first bargain over the wage, and over
employment in the second stage. Given a wage w, the firm would like to
demand Ld(w) while the union would like to supply Ls(w). The bargained
employment L∗(w) will maximize a Nash product of the payoffs.
While Manning’s two-stage timing is very appealing, this model does fea-
ture some dubious axiomatic properties that come from the way the second-
stage modeled. First, the Nash bargaining is done over employment, for a
given wage, while Nash bargaining is most often done over a price or payment.
More importantly, since the bargained labour L∗(w) is some form of average
of the labour demand and the labour supply, the labour bargain curve will
end up steeper than the demand or supply curve. Applied to the context of
monopoly and monopsony power with imperfect substitutability, the result-
ing labour bargain curve when bargaining power is more or less balanced will
be steeper, as if substitutability was lower than under either pure monopoly
or monopsony. The labour bargain curve could be perfectly inelastic, which
would be very problematic in the first stage of the bargaining. Last, if either
the labour demand or supply is perfectly elastic (with a linear production
function or a linear disutility from labour), the labour bargain curve would
also be perfectly elastic, irrespective of the bargaining power.
Instead of bargaining over employment, for a given wage, I assumed that
the firm and union behave as if they were bargaining over the wage, for a
given employment. This has a few advantages. First, this labour bargain
curve will always be more elastic than the pure monopoly or monopsony
curve, and cannot be inelastic. In a sense, when the bargaining power is bal-
anced between the firm and union, this is as if there was perfect competition.
Hence perfect competition can be thought as a well-balanced market.
Alternative bargaining
I have assumed that there are two stages of Nash bargaining, and the worker
and firm have the same relative bargaining power in the two stages. This
is however not crucial. If the bargaining power were different in the two
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stages, this would imply minimal changes for the coefficient λ. Crucially,
what matters for the elasticity e, and hence the sign of the slope of the
Phillips curve, is the bargaining power in the second stage match bargaining.
I have assumed that a firm and a worker share the total surplus of their
match, because the default option is to not work with each other at all. If
instead, I assume that the default option is to work one hour less with each
other, the labour bargain curve would be
Wi
P
= (1− γ)
(
Li
L
)1/η
MRS + γ
(
Li
L
)−1/
MPL
One consequence is that the flexible steady state is no longer efficient: in gen-
eral: MRS 6= MPL. For low and high values of γ, we have MPL > MRS,
which ensures that the surplus of a match is positive. But for intermediate
values this is not the case, so that the match "surplus" would be negative.
In the range where bargaining occurs, it is possible to define an appropri-
ate steady state and labour bargain elasticity. The log linear approximation
around the (new) steady state is the same as equation (2.14):
γ
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)
k[w∗t−pt+k−mrst+k|t]∑+∞
k=0(βθ)
k
(
1− Pv(L)
u′(C)WL
) = (1− γ)∑+∞k=0(βθ)k[w∗t−pt+k−mplt+k|t]∑+∞
k=0(βθ)
k(PF (L)WL −1)
Lemma (1) still holds and provides a log linear MRS and MPL
Now however, since MPL 6= MRS in steady state, the log linear approx-
imation of the real wage in equation (2.13) is slightly modified:
wt+k − pt+k = (1− γ)(MRS)mrst+k + γ(MPL)mplt+k(1− γ)MRS + γMPL
A Phillips Curve can still be built, by adjusting the coefficient λ
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper first introduced a tractable model of monopsony power that
closely resembles the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1979). This model has the advantage of being tractable and symmetric,
and it allows for a close comparison with monopoly power, which almost
always uses the Dixit-Stiglitz framework. While the monopolistic competi-
tion model features imperfect substitution of employers between workers or
worker types – a love of variety – monopsonistic competition features im-
perfect substitutability of workers across different employers or job types.
Workers prefer to work for different employers because the disutility from
working is lower when working with multiple employers – the love of variety
comes from a reduced distaste for work. Having introduced this CES model
of monopsony, it is easy to build a New Keynesian model with wages set by
monopsonic employers. The crucial difference with the classical monopoly
Phillips Curve is that the output-inflation correlation becomes negative.
Then this paper provides a model of bargaining over sticky wages, with
both monopoly and monopsony power for workers and employers respectively.
Because of the imperfect substitutability of workers and firms, a surplus can
be shared through Nash bargaining by the two agents. This process brings
an efficient outcome: depending on the worker’s and firm’s relative bargain-
ing power, the wage will be above or below the worker’s MRS and the firm’s
MPL, but the MRS and MPL are always aligned. When introducing wage
stickiness, the slope of the Phillips Curve also depends on the relative bar-
gaining power of the two agents. Thus, a shift of power from workers to firms
can explain a flattening of the Phillips Curve. Finally, the paper explores the
robustness of the result to different assumptions about the production and
disutility function, as well as the bargaining process. The predictions of the
model are compared with some past events where structural reforms seemed
to have strongly complemented monetary policy: the New Deal, the 1980s
disinflation and liberalisation, and the German Hartz reforms in the early
2000s. I also compare some of the prediction to how monetary policy has
been conducted recently, the nominal interest rate being more responsive to
output than inflation.
Looking at heterogeneity is an obvious avenue for future research. The
balance of power between workers and employers can be quite different across
countries and sectors – and possibly even across firms and regions. On the
empirical side, it would allow to test the prediction using this heterogeneity.
On the theoretical side, it would be useful to understand the impact of mon-
etary shocks (and possibly other shocks) in an economy where some sectors
are more monopolistic while other are more monopsonistic.
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Chapter 3
Featherbedding,
wage bargaining,
and labour market reforms
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3.1 Introduction
Labour market reforms in Europe have been discussed for at least two decades,
but the topic has gained large prominence since the 2008 financial crisis.
While there is a consensus on the long term gains of such policies, there is
more disagreement on their short run impact, and whether or not they should
be implemented in a downturn. While there might have been a political need
for these reforms, in exchange for more dovish monetary and fiscal policies
within the Eurozone, the economic soundness remains a hotly debated topic.
In a famous speech at the 2015 forum in Sintra, ECB chairman Mario
Draghi even argued that the crisis was – in fact – the best moment to imple-
ment structural reforms. On the one hand the very accommodative policy
would accelerate the gains from the reforms and mitigate any negative short
term impact. On the other hand, structural reform would arguably make the
economy more resilient and less sensitive to nominal rigidities. Long term
gains could induce extra investment, increase the natural rate of interest, and
hence shift the economy away from the Zero Lower Bound in the short run.
In contrast, increasing labour force participation and search effort – for
example through a reduction in unemployment benefits or postponing of
retirement age – will have negative aggregate demand effects in the short run,
which can worsen the crisis. It has also been argued that structural reforms
in the goods and labour market tend to reduce prices and wages. Hence, in an
environment of zero or low inflation, these reforms would amount to internal
devaluation, and worsen or lengthen the crisis (Eggertson et al., 2014). Using
a matching model of the labour market, Cacciatore et al. (2016) find that
the short run costs of reducing matching frictions is higher in crisis than in
good times. More unproductive jobs are severed when firing costs are low,
while hirings will be more gradual as the economy slowly recovers.
In this context, the comparison between Germany and southern Europe
is extremely telling. Germany implemented labour market reforms in 2003-
2005 before the crisis, and the unemployment rate has (almost steadily) been
falling since. In Spain, Italy or Greece, structural reforms were only imple-
mented after the sharp post-crisis increase in unemployment; unemployment
kept increasing nevertheless and remains at high levels. As a result, imple-
mentation and timing of reforms has remained contentious. Using detailed
administrative labour market data in Germany and Spain, Gehrke and Weber
(2017) document that reforms of the matching process have weaker effects
when implemented in recessions. This does of course caution against intro-
ducing reforms to mitigate the short-run impact of crisis.
54
What is the effect of labour market rigidities?
Labour market rigidities – and hence labour market reforms that aim to
offset or mitigate them – can take many forms. Some relate to hours and
wages in a given job (maximum hours, minimum wage, centralized collective
bargaining). Other frictions relate to the hiring process (limits and costs
on dismissals and redundancies, mandatory qualifications for a job) or the
labour supply (availability and generosity of unemployment benefits). While
these three classes of labour market rigidities could in theory be independent
of each other (and conceptually they are most often modeled independently),
it is reasonable to assume that hiring and firing frictions, as well as supply
side frictions, have an indirect impact on what employees can bargain for.
Hence many DSGE macro models with labour market rigidities often use
the reduced form interpretation that labour rigidities affect bargaining by
increasing the wage markup. This is the analog of monopolistic competition
in the goods market. In the goods market a producer has some monopoly
power over his own variety, and he charges a uniform price in an anonymous
market. The consumer is a price-taker, but chooses quantity freely. Hence,
the demand curve for the product is unaffected, while the price markup
shifts the supply curve inwards. As a result prices are necessarily higher
and quantities lower. Transposed to the labour market, this means that
the labour supply curve is shifted inwards due to a wage markup, while the
demand curve is unaffected, increasing wages and lowering employment.
It is sensible to assume linear pricing in the goods market (especially re-
tail): in an anonymous market, firms cannot observe demand characteristics
to conduct first-best price discrimination. However, this assumption can be
less sensible for the labour market. Labour isn’t hired by anonymous firms.
Workers or unions have more information about the company in which they
work, as opposed to producers who often know little over their customers.
Hence I will argue that first-best price discrimination can be a more ad-
equate model of wage setting in some labour markets. In that case a worker
or a union is able to extract all the surplus that he generates, and not just his
marginal product. The wage will be equal to the average product of labour,
above the marginal product. This shifts the labour demand curve out, as the
union forces a higher labour demand at any level of wages.
Wage bargaining has two counteracting effects on the labour market. By
setting a wage above the worker’s marginal rate of substitution, employment
is inefficiently low. But since the wage is also above the marginal product of
labour, this tends to increase employment. The two effects can cancel each
other or not. They also provide a more realistic model of unions: they try to
maximize wages, but this is not necessarily at the cost of lower employment.
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Related literature
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), the literature on structural reforms
has studied the best strategies to implement these policies, in order to reduce
the short-term costs and improve the long-run gains. Blanchard and Giavazzi
showed that reforms should be synchronized across the labour, product and
service markup, with an early emphasis on the product and service market
to boost wages and build political support for the reform. Krause and Uhlig
(2012) analyse the German Hartz reforms in a DSGE macro model.
Bayoumi et al. (2004) use the IMF’s Global Economy Model (a calibrated
multi-country DSGE) to analyze the spillover effects of greater competition
in the Euro area, for growth in the rest of the world. Everaert and Schule
(2006) use the same model to emphasize the importance of coordinating
reforms across the Eurozone.
More recently, some DSGE models have focused on time-varying reform
effects. Cacciatore et al. (2016) study product and labour market reforms
in a DSGE model with labour market frictions and find that the timing of
the reform relative to the business cycle greatly matters for the short-run.
Eggertsson et al. (2014) study the deflationary effects of markup reductions
in product and labour markets at the zero lower bound in a New Keyne-
sian DSGE model, and caution about the possible negative consequences.
Michaillat (2012) argues that if jobs are rationed in recessions, labour market
frictions are less important in explaining unemployment during recessions.
This paper is also related to the labour economics literature on collective
bargaining. The model of a union as a monopolist wage setter – the firm
being free to choose employment – dates back to Dunlop (1944), and was
generalised by Nickell and Andrews (1983) as the right-to-manage model.
In contrast, McDonald and Solow (1981) developed a model where unions
bargain over both wages and employment, and in Manning (1987) they can
also bargain over aspects. These models have been dubbed, respectively,
weakly efficient and strongly efficient bargaining.
Finally, this paper has links with the literature on the degree of centrali-
sation of collective bargaining. This literature tended to show that collective
bargaining should either be fully centralised or fully decentralised. With a
centralised wage bargaining process, unions tend to ask for higher wages, but
if the process is centralised enough, they internalise the negative externalities
of having excessive wages. On the other hand, if bargaining is conducted at
intermediate levels like regions or industries, unions will not internalize as
much their decision and ask for excessive wages (the Calmfors and Drifill
hypothesis, see Calmfors and Drifill, 1988 or Layard et al., 1991).
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 develops a model of differen-
tiated workers/unions with monopoly power over employers. If they engage
in monopoly pricing, they charge a price and the firm chooses employment.
But there is another possibility, that I call featherbedding, where the firm
can be forced to hire more labour than what it wishes given the wage. I show
that given the stock of capital, featherbedding can be efficient, but as it acts
as a tax on profits, it vastly reduces 8investment and the level of capital in
the economy. Section 3 looks at structural reforms that reduce the extent of
featherbedding in an economy. The reforms are welfare enhancing because
they increase the capital stock, but the impact on employment is ambiguous.
3.2 The model
Dunlop’s monopoly union model (1944) considered a union setting a wage
unilaterally, knowing the labor demand of the firm. This assumption that
the union can only set a wage, and the firm can choose employment freely,
has been generalised by Nickell and Andrews (1983), and is often referred
as right-to-manage: hiring and firing is the prerogative of the manager. In
contrast, McDonald and Solow (1981) consider a model where the union and
the firm bargain simultaneously over wages and employment. If the union is
able to enforce a level of employment above the firm’s own labour demand,
this leads to over-employment, also referred to as featherbedding. This can
however lead to an efficient contract where over-employment does offset the
negative employment effect of the wage markup.
This paper will compare the right-to-manage and featherbedding models.
In the first the union sets a wage, subject to a labour demand curve. In
the second, the union sets both the wage and the level of employment. Of
course, the wage and employment need to be compatible with the firm not
making a loss, otherwise the plant could simply be shut down entirely. In
the following subsection I detail the participation constraint of this problem.
3.2.1 Featherbedding: labour demand
I model the wage bargaining between a worker and a firm as a principal-
agent problem. There are N workers (or worker types), indexed by i. The
representative firm has a production function F (L). The aggregate labour
supply L is an aggregate of the labour supplied by each worker i, implicitly
defined by:
g(L) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
g(Li)
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Both F (·) and g(·) are increasing, concave function satisfying F (0) = g(0) =
0. Concavity of production requires that F (g−1(·)) is also concave, which is
a stronger condition.1
If the firm observes a wage Wi and is free to choose the amount of labour
Li, the firm’s optimal choice equalizes the marginal surplus with the wage.
The marginal surplus product of type-i labour is
MS(Li) =
∂F
∂Li
= 1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L) F
′(L) = 1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L) MPL (3.1)
On the other hand, if the worker or union of type i is able to choose the
wage and employment together, there is a participation constraint: the firm
must be better off acceptingWi and Li than not employing type i at all. The
participation constraint is that the total surplus is higher than the wage bill:
TS(Li) = F (L1, . . . , Li, . . . , LN)− F (L1, . . . , Li−1, 0, Li+1, . . . , LN)
= F
[
g−1
(
1
N
N∑
k=1
g(Lk)
)]
− F
g−1
 1
N
∑
k 6=i
g(Lk)
 ≥ WiLi
When N is large, the binding participation constraint can be approximated:
TS(Li) =
1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)F
′(L) = 1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)MPL = WiLi
In other words, the wage is the average surplus product of labour
Wi = AS(Li) =
TS(Li)
Li
= 1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)Li
MPL (3.2)
Property 7. (1) Under perfect competition and linear pricing, the firm ob-
serves the wages (Wi) and chooses its labour demands (Li) to maximize its
profits. The marginal surplus product of worker i is equal to the wage.
Wi = MS(Li) =
1
N
g′(Li)
g′(L) MPL
∂ lnWi
∂ lnLi
= g
′′(Li)Li
g′(Li)
(2) Under price discrimination, the worker of type i is able to capture all of
the total surplus that he generates for the firm, WiLi = TS(Li), or
Wi = AS(Li) =
1
N
g(Li)
g′(L)Li
MPL
∂ lnWi
∂ lnLi
= g
′(Li)Li
g(Li)
− 1
1For constant elasticities in the production function and labour aggregate, F (L) = L1−α
and L =
(
1
N
∑N
i=1 L
−1

i
) 
−1
, these conditions imply 1/ < α < 1
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From the concavity of g(·), g(Li)
g′(Li)Li > 1 hence AS(Li) > MS(Li)
The labour demand elasticity,  = − ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi is equal under (1) and (2) if
g(·) has a constant elasticity of substitution.
Under the featherbedding case, the wage is higher for every level of em-
ployment. Or put differently, there is a higher labor demand for every level
of wage. The union imposes a higher demand curve to the firm.
3.2.2 Labour supply
The household of type i maximize the representative utility function
max E0
+∞∑
t=0
βt [u(N.Ct(i))− v(Lt(i))]
subject to a budget constraint
Ct(i) +QtBt(i) = Bt−1(i) +Wt(i)Lt(i) +
Dt
N
The numeraire is the homogeneous consumption good Ct.2 The household
receives a dividend Dt from a diversified equity portfolio, and a wage com-
pensation Wt(i)Lt(i). New bonds Bt can be bought or sold at price Qt, the
stochastic discount factor of the household. As in Erceg et al. (2000) or
Gali (2008), let us assume markets with complete contingent claims for con-
sumption but not leisure. This ensures full consumption smoothing accross
agents.
Lemma 10. With complete markets, there is full consumption smoothing:
∀(t, i) Ct(i) = Ct
N
Qt = Etβ
u′(Ct+1)
u′(Ct)
(3.3)
The labour supply decision for a worker i is equivalent to maximizing the
following quantity in each period
u′(Ct)Wt(i)Lt(i)− v(Lt(i)) (3.4)
subject to the labour demand curve defined in property (1)
2The factor N is simply introduced for scaling reasons as in the labour aggregate previ-
ously. With N symmetric agents, each consumes 1/N of the available total consumption,
Ct(i) = Ct/N but the MRS will feature the marginal utility of aggregate consumption
59
Property 8. (1) Under perfect competition, the wage is equal to the marginal
rate of substitution, Wi = MRSiN =
1
N
v′(Li)
u′(C)
(2) Under both linear pricing and price discrimination, the wage is a
markup over the MRS, with the elasticity  = − ∂ lnLi
∂ lnWi defined in property (1)
Wi =
1
N

− 1MRSi =
1
N

− 1
v′(Li)
u′(C)
As a result, both the competitive market and featherbedding case have
an efficient level of employment, since the MPL is equal to the MRS. With
linear pricing, employment is inefficiently low.
I now assume a continuum of workers/unions, to get rid of the factor N :
Theorem 5. In the symmetric equilibrium
(1) Under perfect competition W = MPL = MRS
(2) Under linear pricing W = MPL = 
−1MRS with  = − g
′(L)
g′′(L)L
(3) Under featherbedding MPL = MRS = −1

W with  = 1
1− g′(L)L
g(L)
Featherbedding is efficient even though the wage is above the MPL and
MRS. However, dividends are abnormally low in this economy:
D = Y −WL = F (L)− 
− 1MPL.L < F (L)−MPL.L
discussion
Labour market rigidities are usually modeled as an employment tax, as it
creates a wedge between the demand and supply of labour. But here, these
rigidities are acting instead as a capital income tax. Instead of having a
wedge between the marginal product of labour and the marginal rate of
substitution, featherbedding creates a wedge between the marginal product
of capital and the returns to capital, and can be thought of as a tax.
Under featherbedding, unions are not detrimental to employment but to
profits. Conditional on the MPL and MRS curves, featherbedding provides
an efficient level of employment and output. But this efficiency is conditional
on a fixed amount of capital. This is no longer the case when I introduce
investment. Featherbedding makes firms’ profits abnormally low, and this
reduces the steady state level of capital in the economy. Firms under invest,
because they will be "held up" once capital is installed (Grout, 1984). The
wedge between the MPK and returns to capital acts as a capital income tax.
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3.2.3 Capital intensity
Let me now introduce capital. The production function is homogeneous in
capital and labour, Y = F (K,L) and capital accumulation writes
Kt+1 = Yt − Ct + (1− δ)Kt
δ is the rate of capital depreciation. Since the firm is not free to use capital
and labour freely, capitalists earn the residual profits of the firm which can
be lower than the marginal product of capital:
RK = F (K,L)−WL
If workers are paid their MPL, capital will be paid its MPK since F is ho-
mogeneous. But if the wage is higher, the returns to capital will be lower.3
Lemma 11. (1) Under perfect competition and linear pricing, the firm chooses
labour competitively, hence the rate of return is the marginal product of cap-
ital. The marginal surplus product of worker i is equal to the wage.
R = ∂F
∂K
(2) Under price discrimination, the wage is above the MPL, hence returns
are lower. There is wedge between the MPK and the returns to capital
R = Y
K
− 
− 1
L
K
∂F
∂L
= ∂F
∂K
− 1
− 1
(
Y
K
− ∂F
∂K
)
comparison
In steady state, the interest rate, net of depreciation, is equal to the rate of
time preference: R = ρ+ δ with ρ = 1/β − 1.
Using lemmas 1–3 as well as C = Y − δK in steady state, I can solve
the equilibrium employment, capital and consumption under perfect compe-
tition, linear pricing and price discrimination
3It is important to note that wages are only bargained after capital has been installed,
so that it leads to a hold up problem of firms by unions. This hold up problem could in
theory be avoided if firms and unions were to bargain over both capital and wages, before
investment takes place (see Grout, 1984). Since firms are stuck once investment takes
place, this requires a commitment that unions will not extract higher wages at this stage.
But here, I have a continuum of atomistic workers/unions. Hence, even if every other
worker was upholding its commitment to secure higher investments, any single worker
would renege and ask for a higher wage, since his own individual action do not affect the
overall level of investments. Hence commitment cannot be an equilibrium here.
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Theorem 6 (proof in appendix). (1) Under linear pricing, L,C and K are
lower than under perfect competition, due to the markup
(2) Under featherbedding, C and K are lower than under perfect compe-
tition. The effect on employment L is ambiguous
(3) C and K are higher under linear pricing than under featherbedding.
The comparative impact on employment L is ambiguous
The intuition is as follows. With linear pricing, the MRS markup reduces
the labour supply and consumption. This reduced labour supply lowers re-
turns to capital hence capital itself, which further reduces the labour supply
and consumption. Under featherbedding, the abnormally low returns to cap-
ital greatly reduce capital and hence output and consumption. For labour,
there is a negative substitution effect (low wages due to low capital) and a
positive income effect (due to the lower consumption). A high elasticity of
consumption in the utility function makes the income effect bigger.
Hence, when the consumption elasticity σ is very low, there is little or no
income effect, so that the substitution effect of lower capital and lower wages
brings the featherbedding employment below the competitive and linear pric-
ing outcome. For very high values of σ, the high income effect dominates
and there is more work than under the two alternatives. For intermediate
values of σ, people work more under featherbedding than linear pricing, but
less than under perfect competition.
Calibration and illustration
As an illustration, I use an isoelastic production function Y = KαL1−α and
an isoelastic, separable utility function u(C)− v(L) = C1−σ1−σ − λL
1+φ
1+φ
Here and in the rest of the paper, I will assume  = 10, so that the
wage markup is µ = 1.1. I assume a capital elasticity α = 0.4, so that the
labour share, including featherbedding, is µ(1 − α) = 0.66. The remaining
parameters are the Frisch elasticity, and relative risk aversion. The Frisch
elasticity is not crucial: it does affect the scale of the effect but not the sign
nor the general profile. In line with other macro models, I assume a relatively
high Frisch elasticity, equal to 2. As I have argued before, the income effect
is crucial, hence the coefficient of relative risk aversion is critical. Reasonable
values in the literature tend to lie between 0.5 and 2, hence I will look at
different values in that interval to illustrate the differences it can generate.
Figure 1 illustrates this, by comparing capital, consumption and labour
under linear pricing and featherbedding (as a ratio of the competitive value).
Conditional on the level of capital, featherbedding is more efficient than
linear pricing, and as efficient as perfect competition. However, once capital
is endogenous, featherbedding is less efficient than the other two outcomes.
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Figure 3.1: consumption, labour, capital and output under featherbedding
and linear pricing, as ratio to flexible outcome, depending on σ
3.3 Application: labour market reforms
This framework is useful to analyse structural labour market reforms. I
assume that the economy starts from a featherbedding situation, with a
markup both on the MPL and MRS side. The structural reform can lower
either the MPL markup alone, or both markups together. These two cases
can be interpreted as two different kinds of reforms, that either preserve
insider/outsider dynamics, or are more inclusive.
One reform provides flexibility to firms by allowing them to choose em-
ployment more freely, below what the union would like, but it doesn’t restrict
the ability of workers to ask for higher wages. Hence the MPL markup is
lowered but not the MRS markup. Employment falls but wages are still
above the MRS. This can be thought of as flexibility at the cost of duality
in the labour market, with high wage insiders and unemployed outsiders.
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The other reform affects both the hiring decision of the firm and the wage
demand of workers. While firms have more freedom to choose a lower level
of employment (the fall in MPL markup), the wage demands of workers also
fall (with the MRS markup). Hence this is a more inclusive reform which
doesn’t protect wages at the cost of employment.
Allowing the MPL or both markups to fall has immediate consequences on
employment, but it also leads to higher investment driven by higher expected
profits. Hence in the long run capital increases, which improves the efficiency
of the economy. This improved efficiency has two effects on employment: the
higher capital increases the real wage while increased consumption will lower
the labour supply. For a very high relative risk aversion, the income effect
can be stronger then the substitution effect.
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Figure 3.2: Marginal (long term) percentage increase in labour with a reduc-
tion in one or two of the markups, depending on the relative risk aversion
σ
Figure 2 shows the long run percentage change in employment caused
by a marginal reduction in one or two of the markups. Not surprisingly,
an inclusive reform is better at reducing unemployment. In fact, reducing
only the MPL markup will often lead to a fall in employment in the long
run. This fall in employment is not welfare deteriorating, especially since
consumption does increase in the long run hence households consume more
and work less. But this does illustrate that not all structural reforms are
beneficial to employment in the long run.
But in a dynamic model, investment demand will have an additional
effect on employment. The rest of the section studies when and how these
structural reforms are beneficial or not to employment in the short run.
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3.3.1 The dynamic equilibrium
I assume an isoelastic production function
Yt = Kαt L1−αt (3.5)
The utility function is also isoelastic:
+∞∑
t=0
βt[u(Ct)− v(Lt)] =
+∞∑
t=0
βt
[
C1−σt
1− σ − λ
L1+φt
1 + φ
]
I assume that the economy starts in a steady state with labour market rigidi-
ties, corresponding to what I have described above: the wage is above the
MRS and the MPL (the two markups being potentially different4)
Wt = µ1tMRSt = µ1tL
φ
tC
σ
t (3.6)
Wt = µ2tMPLt = (1− α)µ2t
(
Kt
Lt
)α
(3.7)
The returns to capital is not the MPK, but the residual profits: Rt = Yt−WtLtKt
If capital can be invested freely, the budget constraint and Euler equation
are, respectively
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct (3.8)
C−σt = βEt
[(
1− δ + Yt+1 −Wt+1Lt+1
Kt+1
)
C−σt+1
]
(3.9)
I also look at quadratic costs of adjusting capital. The budget constraint
and Euler equation now become
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + Yt − Ct − ψ (Kt+1 −Kt)
2
2Kt
(3.10)
C−σt = βEt
 (1− δ + Yt+1−Wt+1Lt+1Kt+1 − ψKt+1−KtKt )C−σt+1
+βψKt+2−Kt+1
Kt+1
C−σt+2
 (3.11)
Equations 3.6, 3.7, and 3.5, combined with 3.8 and 3.9 (or eqs 3.10 and
3.11) are a system of 5 equations in Y, K, L C and W. Starting from steady
state values for µ1 and µ2, it is possible to observe the response to a structural
reform shock that would lower either or both of these markups.
4Perfect competition corresponds to the two markups being equal to 1, and linear
pricing has the MPL markup equal to 1
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fall of MPL markup
I will consider first a sudden fall in the MPL markup at time t. This is an
unanticipated "MIT shock". The economy was at steady state before, and
will converge to the new steady state without facing any additional shock.
But the MRS markup is unaffected: µ2t−1 = µ1t−1 = µ and
∀T ≥ t, µ2T = µ− ut and µ2T = µ
I consider the case of flexible investment, as well as medium (ψ = 3) and high
(ψ = 10) quadratic costs of adjusting capital. In a downturn, investment is
arguably hindered and these high adjustment costs reflect this.
gradual fall of both markups
Later I look at a structural reform that lowers both the MPL and MRS
markups. However, I assume that these two markups do not fall at the same
speed because realistically, some changes can only be gradual. In particular,
even if a policy aims at reducing the two wage markups, it is likely that
the MPL markup will fall more rapidly than the MRS markup. From a
situation of featherbedding, if right-to-manage is introduced (for example by
liberalizing layoffs and reducing the scope of tools available to union), the
effects are likely to be rapid. On the other hand, resisting a fall in the MRS
markup would likely be easier, so that this markup would fall more slowly.
This is not a model of sticky wages. There is a downward rigidity on one
of the wage markups, not on the wage itself. I simply assume that it takes
time for workers to accept that their wage markup is falling. Apart from the
markup, the wage does adjust to market changes like capital or investment.
Hence, I modify the previous set of equations as follows. There is a long
term, permanent markup shock ut and the MPL markup falls immediately
∀T ≥ t, µ2T = µ− ut
However, the MRS markup does fall more gradually: µ1t−1 = µ and
∀T ≥ t, µ1T = θµ1T−1 + (1− θ)(µ− ut)
θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter for the persistence of the MRS markup. I assume
a relatively high θ = 0.95, that corresponds to strong resistance to a fall in
the wage markup, that is likely to occur if there is downward wage rigidity,
particularly in a downturn with low inflation. As with the MPL-only case, I
consider flexible investment and quadratic costs with ψ = 3 and ψ = 10.
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3.3.2 A reduction in featherbedding only
Figures 3.3, 3.4a and 3.4b display the impulse response function to a 1% fall in
the MPL markup, for different values of σ equal to 0.5, 1 and 2 respectively.5
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Figure 3.3: IRF to a 1% fall in the MPL markup, σ = 0.5
For σ = 0.5, we had seen before, in figure (3.2a) that the long term
impact on employment was virtually zero. In the short run, the impact on
employment is driven negatively by the markup, and positively by additional
investment. But since the relative risk aversion is low, most of the investment
is done by consuming less rather than working more, as the fall in consump-
tion is less costly than the increase in labour. When investment is flexible,
the increased demand for investment virtually cancels the lower demand from
the fall in the MPL markup, but with costly capital adjustment, investment
is not strong enough to offset the lower MPL markup.
For higher values of σ, the long run effect on employment is negative. But
in the short run, consumption falls less, hence the extra investment is mainly
done through extra work not reduced consumption. There is a small positive
impact on employment in the short run, but it can be reduced or canceled
out if capital adjustment costs are strong and slow down investment.
5see appendix for for more extreme values of σ, equal to 0.2 and 4
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Figure 3.4: IRF to a 1% fall in MPL markup, σ = 1 and σ = 2
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3.3.3 Fall in both markups
Figures 3.5, 3.6a and 3.6b display the impulse response function to a 1% fall in
the both markups, for different values of σ equal to 0.5, 1 and 2 respectively.6
While the fall in the MPL markup is immediate, the MRS markup only falls
gradually, with a persistence factor θ as argued previously.
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Figure 3.5: IRF to a 1% fall in both markups, σ = 0.5
Now, employment always increases in the long run, although it increases
more for lower values of σ. Since the MPL markup falls immediately after the
reform while the MRS markup falls much more gradually, the initial impact
of these falls in markups is negative, similar to the fall of only one markup.
At the same time, there is also a bigger increase in capital, which triggers
more investment in the short run. Hence employment in the short run is
higher in this case than under the fall of only one markup, especially with
a high relative risk aversion when the investment demand is addressed by
higher employment rather than smaller consumption.
However, it is only on the long run that this more inclusive reform shows
its true superiority compared to the other, in terms of boosting employment.
6see appendix for for more extreme values of σ, equal to 0.2 and 4
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Figure 3.6: IRF to a fall in both markups, σ = 1 and σ = 2
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3.4 Conclusion
In this paper I have built a model of featherbedding in the labour market,
and I have argued that it can be a good description of some sectors or in-
dustries where labour unions are relatively strong. I have shown that with
featherbedding, the wage is a markup over workers’ marginal rate of substi-
tution (MRS), but the wage is also a markup over firms’ marginal product
of labour. If these two markups are equal, the MPL and MRS are equalised,
in contrast to monopoly pricing where there is a markup on the MRS but
not the MPL. However, since the wage is above the MPL, firms’ profits are
abnormally low. Hence when capital is introduced, this leads to an ineffi-
ciently low level of capital, with ambiguous effect on employment depending
on agents’ relative risk aversion. I argue that with featherbedding labour
market rigidities act as a tax on capital and not as a tax on labour.
I than considered the impact – particularly on employment – of structural
reforms that aim to reduce the featherbedding rigidity. If the reform only
allows firm to choose employment more freely without reducing the monopoly
markup of unions, welfare improves, but the short and long term effects on
employment are small or negative. This has resemblance to the insider-
outsider literature where reforms that only affect new entrants in the labour
market tend to be less effective. On the other hand, if the reform lowers
both markups at the same time, welfare improves more, and employment
does increase more, or at least fall less. In the short and middle run, the
effect of these two kind of reforms strongly depends on the relative speed of
adjustment of the two markups, and on the easiness with which investment
demand for labour can offset any negative short term effect.
Using this framework in larger DSGE models is an obvious possibility of
future research. This paper did not introduce nominal rigidities per se, and
has no role for a central bank. But a larger model would enable me to see how
a central bank can accompany the structural reform and ease any negative
effect in the short run. Introducing entry by firms would also make capital
adjustment more gradual, so that short term pain might be lengthened.
While featherbedding is likely more prevalent in the labour market, some
similar can exist in the market for goods and services. In sectors with very
little competition, it is not uncommon that consumers have little choice about
the amount of goods or services that they can buy, and are forced to buy
more than what they would wish. One of the first effects of liberalisation,
in such cases, is that new entrants break the one-size-fit-all equilibrium and
cater more closely to the needs of the consumer, by selling in more divisible
quantities, or by creating low cost products. The framework of this paper
could hence also be used in the goods and labour market.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
First order approximation
The first order condition with respect to W ∗t is
0 = γ
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
(
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
(1 + e)Lt+k|t − eLt+k|tW ∗t v
′(Lt+k|t)
)
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
(
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
W ∗t Lt+k|t − v(Lt+k|t)
)
+ (1− γ)
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
(
e
Lt+k|t
W ∗t
Pt+kF
′(Lt+k|t)− (1 + e)Lt+k|t
)
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
(
Pt+kF (Lt+k|t)−W ∗t Lt+k|t
)
or LHS = RHS with
LHS = γ
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
Lt+k|t
[
(1 + e)W ∗t − ePt+kMRSt+k|t
]
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)ku′(Ct+k)
(
W ∗t Lt+k|t
Pt+k
− v(Lt+k|t)
u′(Ct+k)
)
RHS = (1− γ)
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)k
u′(Ct+k)
Pt+k
Lt+k|t
[
(1 + e)W ∗t − ePt+kMPLt+k|t
]
∑+∞
k=0(βθ)ku′(Ct+k)
(
F (Lt+k|t)− W
∗
t Lt+k|t
Pt+k
)
Around a zero inflation equilibrium, we haveMRS = MPL =
(
1 + 1
e
)
W
P
.
Let’s assume F (L) = L1−α = L1−αMPL = L
1+ 1
e
1−α
W
P
.
Similarly, v(L)
u′(C) =
L1+φ
u′(C) =
L
1+φMRS = L
(1+ 1e)
1+φ
W
P
Then F (L)− WL
P
=
1
e
+α
1−α
WL
P
and WL
P
− v(L)
u′(C) =
φ− 1
e
1+φ
WL
P
The first order log approximation of LHS and RHS become
lhs = γ (1− βθ) (1 + φ)
φ− 1
e
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
w∗t −
(
pt+k +mrst+k|t
)]
rhs = (1− γ)(1− βθ) (1− α)1
e
+ α
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
w∗t −
(
pt+k +mplt+k|t
)]
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mrst+k|t = mrst+k + φ(lt+k|t − lt+k) = mrst+k + eφ(w∗t − wt+k), so
lhs = γ (1− βθ) (1 + φ)
φ− 1
e
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k [(1− eφ) (w∗t − wt+k) + (wt+k − pt+k)−mrst+k]
mplt+k|t = mrst+k − α(lt+k|t − lt+k) = mplt+k − eα(w∗t − wt+k), so
rhs = (1−γ)(1− βθ) (1− α)1
e
+ α
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k [(1 + eα) (w∗t − wt+k) + (wt+k − pt+k)−mplt+k]
The aggregate wage satisfies W
P
= (1− γ) η
η+1MRS + γ

−1MPL, so
wt+k − pt+k = (1− γ˜)mrst+k + γ˜mplt+k
with γ˜ = γ

−1
(1−γ) η
η+1+γ

−1
= γ

−1
e
e+1
lhs = γ (1− βθ) (1 + φ)
φ− 1
e
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
(1− eφ) (w∗t − wt+k)
+γ˜ (mplt+k −mrst+k)
]
rhs = (1− γ)(1− βθ) (1− α)1
e
+ α
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
(1 + eα) (w∗t − wt+k)
+(1− γ˜) (mrst+k −mplt+k)
]
Setting lhs = rhs implies
(γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α))w∗t
= (1− βθ)
+∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k
[
(γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α))wt+k
+
(
γ(1+φ)
eφ−1 γ˜ +
(1−γ)(1−α)
1+αe (1− γ˜)
)
(mplt+k −mrst+k)
]
This can be written recursively as
(w∗t − wt) = (1−βθ)
γ(1+φ)
eφ−1 γ˜ +
(1−γ)(1−α)
1+αe (1− γ˜)
γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α) (mrst −mplt)+βθ
(
w∗t+1 − wt
)
As a result, I get a Phillips curve
pit =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
λ (mrst −mplt) + βpit+1
with a slope coefficient
λ =
γ(1+φ)
φ−1/e γ˜ +
(1−γ)(1−α)
α+1/e (1− γ˜)
γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α)
(−1
e
)
λ =
γ2(1+φ)(1+1/e)
φ−1/e

−1 +
(1−γ)2(1−α)(1+1/e)
α+1/e
η
η+1
γ (1 + φ) + (1− γ) (1− α)
(−1
e
)
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
Proofs
Theorem 7. (1) Under linear pricing, L,C and K are lower than under
perfect competition, due to the markup
(2) Under featherbedding, C and K are lower than under perfect compe-
tition. L is ambiguous
(3) C and K are higher under monopoly than under featherbedding. L is
ambiguous
Proof : (1) write (K,L,C) as a function of the markup µ
MPL(K,L)− µMRS(C,L) = 0
MPK(K,L)− (ρ+ δ) = 0
F (K,L)− δK − C = 0
Differentiating this system with a Jacobian,
KFKL
FL
LFLL
FL
− Lv′′(L)
v′(L)
u′′(C)
u′(C)C
KFKK LFKL 0
KFK −Kδ LFL −C


∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
 = 10
0
SinceMPL andMPK are homogenous of degree 0 in (K,L), it can be shown
that
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ =
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ =
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ =
−1
σ + φ
with σ and φ the (possibly local) elasticities of the utility of consumption
and disutility of work.
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(2) write (K,L,C) as a function of the markup µ
MPL(K,L)−MRS(C,L) = 0
F (K,L)− µLMPL(K,L)− (ρ+ δ)K = 0
F (K,L)− δK − C = 0
A similar differentiation brings
KFKL
FL
LFLL
FL
− Lv′′(L)
v′(L)
u′′(C)
u′(C)C
(µ− 1)− µKFKL
FL
(1− µ)− µLFLL
FL
0
KFK −Kδ LFL −C


∂ lnK
∂ lnµ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ
 = 0µ
0
Using the (possibly local) elasticities of the production and utility function,
this gives
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ =
α + φ+ σLFLC
α− (µ−1)
µ
 −1
φ+ σ <
−1
φ+ σ
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ =
[
α + φ (KFK−Kδ)
C
]
α− (µ−1)
µ
−1
φ+ σ <
−1
φ+ σ
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ =
α− σ (µ−1)δ(1−α)+ραµδ(1−α)+ρ
α− (µ−1)
µ
 −1
φ+ σ ≷ 0
(3) Comparing the cases (1) and (2) above, one simply needs to look at
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ |(2) <
∂ lnK
∂ lnµ |(1)
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ |(2) <
∂ lnC
∂ lnµ |(1)
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ |(2) ≷
∂ lnL
∂ lnµ |(1)
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Figure B.1: IRF to a fall in MPL markup, σ = 0.2 and σ = 4
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Figure B.2: IRF to a fall in both markups, σ = 0.2 and σ = 4
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